The Duty To Decide Vs. The Daedalian Doctrine
Of Abstention
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It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid
a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever
doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we
would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do,
is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform
our duty.
-Chief Justice John Marshall, in
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).

I.

INTRODUCTION

How unfortunate it is that Congress must enact legislation
to impress upon the federal judiciary that it meant what it said
over one hundred years ago when it passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1871! And yet, in response to what Justice Brennan calls "a
series of decisions [which] has shaped the doctrines of jurisdiction, justiciability, and remedy, so as increasingly to bar the federal courthouse door in the absence of showings probably impossible to make,"' Congress indeed is finding itself prompted to reassert its "belief . . . that the Federal Government-not the indi* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, visiting at
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1. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489, 498 (1977).
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vidual States-[is] the primary protector of our basic constitutional freedoms." 2
On January 10, 1977, Senators Mathias and Brooke initiated
their response to "such judicial doctrines as comity, standing,
federalism, abstention, and the exhaustion of State judicial remedies, [by which] the Court has significantly curtailed the availability of the Federal courts as a forum," 3 by introducing a bill
4
entitled The Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977. Congressman Mitchell of Maryland introduced the same bill in the House
on March 4, 1977.1 Principal features of the Civil Rights Improvements Act would expand the definition of "person" under United
States Code section 19836 to include states, municipalities, and
all their political units and governmental agencies, would render
inapplicable the doctrine of abstention in section 1983 actions,
and would embody the circumstances within section 1983 when
a federal court can interfere in a pending state criminal proceeding. 7
Although the thrust of this article is not a detailed analysis
of the particulars of this proposed legislation, the utility of a brief
description of the bill, by way of prefacing this article's thesis,
cannot be gainsaid, for the sentiments of the bill's sponsors coincide with the subject of this article: the closing of federal courthouse doors in the face of the federal judiciary's duty to decide
those cases where Congress has created jurisdiction and provided
a cause of action.
The degree to which the bill directly addresses certain recent
2. 123 CONG. Rac. S202 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Mathias).
3. Id. That Senators Mathias and Brooke are concerned with the same "series of
decisions" which trouble Justice Brennan, see text accompanying note 1 supra, is illustrated by Senator Mathias's quote of the Justice's characterization of those decisions in a
speech delivered on January 29, 1977. Remarks by Senator Mathias, Conference on Access
to the Federal Courts, sponsored by the Society of American Law Teachers, the American
Civil Liberties Union, and the Committee for Public Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
29, 1977) (on file with the authors).
4. S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S205 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977).
5. H.R. 4514, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. H1756 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1977).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
7. See 123 CONG. REc. S201 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias). The
"brand" of abstention which the bill would abolish is that which leads a federal court to
refuse to hear a § 1983 case on the ground that the "action raises, in addition to any
question of Federal constitutional or statutory law, a question of State law which has not
been previously decided by the highest Court of such State or which, if decided by a State
court, could render unnecessary" the decision by the federal court with respect to the
federal issues. Id. at S205. See the opening paragraph of Part II infra, for a recognition
that there are other types of abstentidn as well.
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pronouncements by the Supreme Court is extensive.' As explained by Senator Mathias's remarks upon the bill's introduction,9 the Civil Rights Improvements Act would follow the Court's
cue in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer'° by exercising Congress's power to
make the states amenable to civil rights suits. In Fitzpatrick
the Court paved the way for Congress to amend section 1983 to
provide for suits against State and State officials. The Court
held that the 11th amendment and the doctrine of State sovereignty were limited by the enforcement provision of section 5 of
the 14th amendment, and thus justified congressional authorization of suits which would be constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts."
The bill, in section 2(e), also sweeps aside the judicial doctrine of abstention in section 1983 actions and replaces it with
several legislative provisions which considerably restore the civil
rights plaintiff's access to federal courts. With respect to pending
state criminal proceedings, the bill's section 2(e)(3)(A) generally
continues the prohibition on federal intervention in accord with
Younger v. Harris," but modifies the Younger rule in at least one
crucial respect. Whereas Younger allowed only one narrow, restrictive exception to abstention upon a showing that the state
criminal proceeding was accompanied with bad faith harassment,
one of those "showings probably impossible to make, ''13 Congress
is being asked to add a second exception to nonintervention where
the civil rights plaintiff alleges, and the district court finds, that
the criminal statute forming the basis of the state proceeding is
unconstitutional on its face and is likely to deter the exercise of
protected first amendment rights. In effect, this second exception
8. 123 CONG. REC. S203 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Mathias).
9. Id. at S201-07.
10. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See Part III.A. infra.
11. 123 CONG. REc. S203 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Mathias).
12. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
13. Brennan, supra note 1, at 498. Just how "impossible" it is to demonstrate bad
faith harassment to the satisfaction of the Court is illustrated by Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332 (1975). The three-judge district court, on the basis of the detailed "objective facts
set forth in the first part of" its opinion, found that the plaintiffs fell within even the
narrow Younger exception by "clearly demonstrat[ing] bad faith and harassment." 388
F. Supp. 350, 360 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The lower court amplified its reasoning in connection
with this conclusion in both its original and supplementary opinions. Id. at 360, 361-62.
Yet the Supreme Court brushed aside the finding of bad faith harassment by the district
court simply by labeling it "vague and conclusory." 422 U.S. at 350. To be sure, the
Supreme Court quoted the "conclusory" passages from the district court's opinions, id.
at 350 n.19, but failed to discuss, except in the most superficial fashion, the "objective
facts" upon which they were based. Id. at 350-51.
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would reinstate the holding of Dombrowski v. Pfister," a holding
discredited by the Court in Younger. And this important change
in the abstention doctrine results from only the narrowest reading
of section 2(e)(3)(A) of the bill. For the wording of that section
actually allows federal intervention whenever the plaintiff alleges, and the district court finds, "that extraordinary circumstances exist justifying such intervention including"'5 the two
exceptions just discussed. A broader, and more sound, reading of
the bill thus would treat the two legislatively-mentioned exceptions as merely illustrative of "extraordinary circumstances...
justifying

. . .

intervention"-not as limitations on what federal

courts may deem to be "extraordinary circumstances." The two
exceptions are simply included within the concept of
"extraordinary circumstances"-they do not define the limits of
that concept.
Moreover, the Civil Rights Improvements Act would reverse
legislatively two unfortunate extensions of the Younger doctrine.
With respect to state criminal proceedings, section 2 (e)(3)(C)
would repudiate the Supreme Court's holding in Hicks v.
5 that Younger mandates abstention even
Miranda"
if the state
proceeding is initiated after the filing of the federal complaint, so
long as no "proceedings of substance on the merits have taken
place in federal court."' 7 As Senator Mathias recognizes, echoing
5 "this is a particularly
the dissent by Justice Stewart in Hicks,"
troublesome rule-one that invites State prosecutors to file a
State suit to preclude Federal jurisdiction."' 9 Accordingly, the
troublesome rule is replaced in section 2(e)(3)(C) with one explicitly stating that the general nonintervention provision does not
apply if the state criminal proceeding is commenced after the
filing of the federal complaint.
The bill also "rejects the expansion of

. .

. Younger to civil

proceedings first clearly enunciated in Huffman"

0

by explicitly

14. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. S205 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (emphasis added).
16. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
17. Id. at 349.
18. Id. at 353-57.
19. 123 CONG. REc. S204 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Mathias). The
characterization used by Justice Stewart was strikingly similar: "Today's opinion virtually instructs state officials to answer federal complaints with state indictments." 422
U.S. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20. 123 CONG. REc. S204 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Mathias). The
Senator was referring to the Court's holding in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 593
(1975). See also text accompanying notes 22-23 infra.
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stating in section 2(e)(3)(B) that the prohibition on intervention
does "not apply where the pending proceeding is civil in nature,
even if such proceeding is in aid of and closely related to the
enforcement of a criminal statute."'" The Court's further expansion of Younger and Huffman to the civil area in its March 22,
1977, decision in Juidice v. Vail 2 and its May 31, 1977, decision
in Trainor v. Hernandez3 makes this rejection even more essential.
Those, then, are some of the features of the proposed Civil
Rights Improvements Act. Its proponents astutely observe that
the bill addresses Supreme Court cases which, despite their frequent invocation of constitutional concepts such as federalism,
more accurately are viewed as reflecting "the concerns of the
Court's new majority-especially the growing problem of overburdened Federal courts. 2' 4 And the bill's sponsors seek to issue
a most appropriate response to those concerns: "Congress cannot
fail to heed the concern expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the need to ease the growing burden on the Federal court
system, ' 25 but also when Congress creates jurisdiction and provides causes of action, the federal judiciary cannot fail to perform
its assigned duties. Accordingly, the federal judiciary should perform its tasks by fulfilling its duty to decide cases, while Congress
should perform its responsibilities by "provid[ing] legislation to
help expedite justice in our Federal courts. ' 2 And even if such
legislation is not as forthcoming as the courts would wish, then
nevertheless by "reaffirm[ing] Congress's commitment to the
vigorous enforcement of our civil rights laws," it is telling the
judiciary to exercise its powers and duties while awaiting congressional solution to the problem of overburdened dockets.3
Only by adherence to such a response can both the courts
and Congress legitimately maintain their respective entitlements
to serve the sovereign People of the United States. For only by
adherence to the Constitution which governs both branches can
they acquire the legitimacy required of them in the performance
21. S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. S205 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977).
22. 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977).
23. 97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977).
24. 123 CONG. REc. S202 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Mathias).
25. Id. at S204. See Part II infra.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Perhaps, in connection with this paraphrase, the reader should glance at the
authors' "apology" to the sponsors of the bill appearing in the last paragraph of this
Introduction.
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of their duties as assigned to them by their ultimate masters, the
People. And it cannot be forgotten that the Constitution, that
governing document, warmly embraces the principle of fractionalized, separated powers, and that a failure to perform the duties
assigned via the separation of powers is as repugnant to the principle as the encroachment of one branch of government into the
29
areas reserved for the operations of another.
Accordingly, it is the thesis of this article that the growing
trend in the federal courts to refuse to exercise their assigned
jurisdiction violates the doctrine of the separation of powers, and
that the federal judiciary's excuses for refusing to perform their
tasks do not pass constitutional muster. Specifically, this article
will demonstrate that those excuses either do not rise to a level
of constitutional concern sufficient to justify the trend or are
based on a perversion of the admittedly-constitutional concept of
federalism, a concept affording the individual citizen a structural
protection against arbitrary government in additionto the structural protection flowing from separated powers-not a concept
that properly can be used to deprive the individual of federal
protection. After establishing the inadequacies of the courts' excuses for refusing to decide cases, this article then points to the
provisions of article III and article I, section 8, clause 9, of the
Constitution to show that, given Congress's power to create
within constitutional limits the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, 30 and given that judiciary's power to decide all cases properly
arising pursuant to Congress's constitutional exercise of its powers, the federal courts abrogate the separation doctrine, in effect
destroying their own jurisdiction, however the practice is couched
in nonjurisdictional rubric, whenever they refuse to exercise such
jurisdiction by not deciding those cases which Congress has determined should be decided. In short, the federal courts have a duty
to decide.
This conclusion is reached first by portraying in Part II the
pervasiveness of the problem embodied in the trend away from
the exercise of jurisdiction. That portrayal will show that the
problem stretches far beyond the subject of the proposed Civil
29. See generally Abrahams & Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative
Crimes: A Study of Irreconcilables, 1976 So. ILL. UNIv. L.J. 1, especially Parts ll.A. and
IV.
30. Congress, of course, is limited constitutionally with respect to those subjects over
which it can confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, and those courts have a duty to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction when and if Congress exceeds its limits. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Part llI.B. infra.
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Rights Improvements Act and that the components of the problem are highly interrelated. Components of a nonconstitutional
nature are briefly discredited to pave the way for a treatment of
federalism and separation of powers in Part I. Part III will demonstrate that those two structural protections not only are not
inconsistent with the duty to decide, as could be argued from a
comparison of this article's separation-based thesis with the
Court's superficial treatment of federalism, but that read together they in fact establish the unconstitutionality of the trend
away from this duty. As the article progresses, the reader will
notice an increasing focus on Younger abstention, as that case
and its progeny are perhaps the most obvious manifestations of
the trend. Accordingly, not all assertions made in Part HI will be
applicable to all components of the problem discussed in Part II,
but for the most part the general principles discussed in Part III
will have application beyond the Younger problem.
With that disclaimer in mind, perhaps a few others are also
appropriate. As mentioned earlier, this article does not attempt
a further, particularized discussion of the Civil Rights Improvements Act. Suffice it to say, then, that the authors applaud the
endeavors of Senators Mathias and Brooke, as well as Congressman Mitchell, and apologize for "using" their bill as a build-up
to the statement of the position of this article, a statement which
may have gone beyond the stands taken by the bill's sponsors.
Moreover, the reader should be aware that the tone of the statement of this article's thesis will not slacken. Do not expect the
"objective" treatment characterizing most typical, wellresearched articles. Rather, expect an impassioned plea which
attempts to articulate one of several possible theories which coherently criticize the trend in the federal courts toward their refusal to exercise their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the authors admittedly rely extensively on cases and literature supportive of
their criticism, while simply recognizing somewhat superficially
the contrary arguments, except to the extent that there is a need
to discuss fully the "other side" in order to articulate their theory.
The result is an article whose bias is clear not only textually, but
also in terms of its embodiment of research. It seeks, via the
discussion of general principles, to criticize the ideas "behind"
the trend, not to engage in a narrowly-focused or exhaustive caseby-case analysis of the decisions reflecting the trend. Such a caseby-case discussion would add little to the current literature."
31. Extensive citation to the "current literature" would be a more tedious than gra-
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THE PERVASIVENESS AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE

PROBLEM AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS: ALL ROADS LEAD (BACK) TO
THE CONSTITUTION

The problem of federal courts refusing to exercise their jurisdiction, whatever rubric is used to describe the practice, is not of
recent origin, but yet is one which increasingly permeates the
federal judiciary's decision-making-or lack of it! The problem
stretches beyond the subject of the proposed Civil Rights Improvements Act to encompass the other types of abstention, or
nonintervention; 32 indeed, it stretches even beyond the abstention
doctrines as a whole to include seemingly-isolated but
with such varied subjects as
conceptually-related cases dealing
3
habeas corpus 33 and water rights .

The purpose of this Part is to illustrate this pervasiveness
and complexity by examining many, but of course not all, of the
concepts, cases, congressional enactments, and policy discussions
which bear on the problem. Foremost is an intent to portray the
holistic, interrelated nature of these component concepts, cases,
enactments, and discussions to pave the way for Part III's examination of federalism and the separation of powers. Specifically,
tuitous gesture; as Professor Wright has observed, "[tihe literature is immense, and
tends to become quickly dated as new cases reshape the doctrine." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52A, at 229 n.1 (3d ed. 1976). A few references to some
of the most recent writings should suffice, then. So, in addition to the discussion in
Professor Wright's treatise, see Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
590 (1977), for a look at non-Younger abstention; Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors:A
Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil
Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1976), and Harris, Application of the Abstention Doctrine to Inverse CondemnationActions in Federal Court, 4 PEPPERDINE L. Rxv. 1 (1976),
for two views of nonintervention in the context of state civil proceedings, see also text
accompanying notes 20-23 supra; Note, Federal Courts, Injunctions, DeclaratoryJudgments, and State Law: The Supreme Court Has Finally Fashioned a Workable
"Abstention Doctrine," 25 CLv. ST. L. REv. 75 (1976), for a view largely contrary to the
themes of this article; Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First
Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740 (1974), for a precedent-oriented analysis which concludes, consistently with the present authors' arguments, that Younger abstention should
be discarded; Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the
Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125
U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1976), for an explicitly middle-ground view, id. at 268-69, somewhere
between the position taken by this article and that taken by the Note in the Cleveland
State Law Review.
32. See WRIGHT, supra note 31, at §§ 52-52A, for a discussion of the various forms of
abstention. Cf. Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 81317 (1976), discussed in Part H infra, for the Court's own three-way classification of abstention cases.
33. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed infra.
34. See Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),
discussed infra.
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this intent can be divided into two separate yet consistent goals:
first, the authors seek to recognize certain aspects of the problem
not discussed further in Part III to ensure that the reader grasps
the totality of the problem; secondly, the authors seek in this Part
to generalize from the narrow topics and their relationships to the
real focus of this article-the federal courts' trend toward refusals
to decide and the need to reverse that trend as a matter of federalism and separated powers.
This Part also will begin to address excuses for the trend.
Those excuses of nonconstitutional stature will be discredited,
leaving the constitutional-based excuses to be dissected in Part
III. It may not be inappropriate, then, for the reader to conceptualize this Part as a strainer of sorts, filtering out contaminants
of a nonconstitutional nature. Each time a case, concept, statute,
or policy discussion is filtered through the strainer, only those
elements of a constitutional nature are left for further study. And
it therefore should not be surprising, given the biases of those
performing the distillation, that each time a topic is filtered
through the strainer, only the elements of federalism and/or separated powers remain. Thus a bridge is formed between the recognition of the problem as pervasive, complex, interrelated-indeed
chaotic!-and the analysis of the constitutional components of
the problem in Part III.
Breaking into a holistic system is often difficult though. A
first probing of the frontier of the problem, as exemplified by the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Stone v. Powell, 5 will ease this
initial ingress. The two paragraphs prefacing Justice Brennan's
acerbic dissent in Stone present an excellent encapsulation of the
decision:
The Court today holds "that where the State has provided
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial." ...
But these cases, despite the veil of Fourth Amendment terminology employed by the Court, plainly do not involve any question of the right of a defendant to have evidence excluded from
use against him in his criminal trial when that evidence was
seized in contravention of rights ostensibly secured by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, they involve the
question of the availability of a federal forum for vindicating
35. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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those federally guaranteed rights. Today's holding portends
substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction,
and I dissent.
The Court's opinion does not specify the particular basis on
which it denies federal habeas jurisdiction over claims of Fourth
Amendment violations brought by state prisoners . . . I can
only presume that the Court intends to be understood to hold
"in custody in violation of
either that respondents are not .
the Constitution or laws of the United States," or that
"considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice" . . . are sufficient to allow this Court
to rewrite jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress. Neither
ground of decision is tenable; the former is simply illogical, and
the latter is an arrogationof power committed solely to the
Congress.11

The force and accuracy of this description could only be diluted by anything more than minimal additional observation.
The very wording of the Court's holding in Stone compels a federal district court to dismiss a habeas petition where the court
finds there has been at the state level a full and fair hearing of
the fourth amendment claim-even if the result of that "full and
fair" hearing is a substantively erroneous conclusion in favor of
the prosecution.37 So, once a state grants a "full and fair" hearing,
36. Id. at 502-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting; footnotes deleted; emphasis added in the
second paragraph).
37. 428 U.S. at 481-82, 494; see also text accompanying note 36 supra. It is most
difficult to discern how the Court could have held that the respondents in Stone and its
companion case received state hearings which were both full and fair in view of the facts
that both of the respondents presented their fourth amendment claims at every stage of
their respective state proceedings, id. at 470, 472, that at each stage their claims were
rejected by the state courts, id., and that each rejection was at least highly questionable,
if not downright erroneous, as a matter of consistency with Supreme Court precedent. Id.
at 471 n.2, 473 n.3; see also id. at 528-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, in Wolff v.
Rice, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the companion case to Stone, the respondent based his fourth
amendment claim on assertions that the affidavit upon which the police secured a warrant
to search his apartment "was clearly deficient under prevailing constitutional standards,"
id. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and that the information contained in the deficient
warrant had been supplemented at his suppression hearing by testimony not presented
to the issuing magistrate. Id. In the face of these assertions, even the Supreme Court
majority was forced to admit that it had "several times rejected" the contention that such
supplementation is permissible. Id. at 505 n.3. (How ironic that the Wolff case emanated
from Nebraska, a state not known for its scrupulous concern for the protection of criminal
defendants. Cf. id. at 531-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Snowden, A Holistic Jurisprudential View of the Drug Victim, 54 NEB. L. REv. 350, 361-77 (1975).) It is not surprising, in
view of the Court's treatment of the "full and fair" issue, that some lower federal courts
have been more hesitant to find "full and fair" opportunities to litigate fourth amendment
claims when addressing situations calling for the interpretation and application of Stone
and Wolff. See Gates v. Henderson, 45 U.S.L.W. 2374-76 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1977); Curry v.
Garrison, 423 F. Supp. 109 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
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the criminal defendant has lost his ability to question the correctness of the outcome of that hearing: no court in the federal system
can review in habeas proceedings the errors of state courts in
fourth amendment cases! What has become of article I, section
9, clause 2 of the Constitution?
That is precisely what Justice Brennan asked in his dissent
in Stone, and that is precisely the subject of a final observation
on the case. Realizing the Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule could not mask the true import of the decision, Justice Brennan identified the "real ground of today's decision-a
ground that is particularly troubling in light of its portent for
habeas jurisdiction generally-[as] the Court's novel reinterpretation of the habeas statutes. ' 3 This reinterpretation is composed of "a 'discretion' judicially manufactured today contrary to
the express statutory language. ' 31 The dissenters justifiably wonder where this discretion will end: what of cases of "double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and
use of invalid identification procedures?"40 Indeed, are any
"grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention"" immune
from
this "discretion"? Is it surprising that states already have sought
to expand the Stone holding to some of these other areas?" Can
the reader rebut Justice Brennan's assertion that "the centuriesold remedy of habeas corpus was so circumscribed last Term as
to weaken drastically its ability to safeguard individuals from
invalid imprisonment"?13
Surely it is no coincidence this statement immediately follows one decrying recent extensions of Younger abstention, and
that both statements are used as explanations and examples of
how federal courthouse doors are being barred by decisions shaping "the doctrines of jurisdiction, justiciability, and remedy. '"' 4
At least one Justice sees the connection between the habeas cases
and other manifestations of the trend away from the duty to
45
decide. Indeed, citing Stone and Hicks v. Miranda
in the same
breath, Justice Brennan stated in his article:
38. 428 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 516.
40. Id. at 517-18.
41. Id. at 517.
42. See, e.g., Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51, 53 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977), where the court,
fortunately, rejected one state's attempt to extend Stone to a double jeopardy setting.
43. Brennan, supra note 1, at 498, citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Francis
v. Hendersen, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
44. Brennan, supra note 1, at 498.
45. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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Unfortunately, federalism has taken on a new meaning of late.
In its name, many of the door-closing decisions described above
have been rendered. Under the banner of the vague, undefined
notions of equity, comity, and federalism the Court has condoned both isolated and systematic violations of civil liberties.
Such decisions hardly bespeak a true concern for equity. Nor do
they properly understand the nature of our federalism. Adopting
the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal judiciary. But in so doing, it has forgotten that one of the strengths of our federal system is that it
provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism is not served when the federal half of that
protection is crippled."
Having thus cut through the verbiage of Stone and properly
reduced it to a case embodying perverted notions of federalism,
notions addressed in Part III.A. of this article, Justice Brennan
has paved the way for a similar analysis of abstention by evoking
the hobgoblins of "equity, comity, and federalism." For those
hobgoblins formed the very basis for the Supreme Court's deci47 and its voluminous progeny. Already
sion in Younger v. Harris
described briefly in the Introduction to this article and more thoroughly in the literature," the holding in Younger easily could be
deemed to be one of the biggest door-closers: in the absence of a
showing of bad faith harassment, a federal court shall not interfere in an on-going state criminal proceeding, even in the face of
an allegation that the proceeding violates the civil rights and
liberties guaranteed the defendant under the Constitution. This
holding has been extended both within the criminal context and
to civil areas 4 9-and it lies at the very core of the problems addressed both by the sponsors of the proposed Civil Rights Improvements Act and by the authors of this article.5 0
46. Brennan, supra note 1, at 502-03 (footnotes deleted).
47. 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
48. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
49. See Introduction supra.
50. Before examining the equity and comity bases for the Younger holding, recognizing that the federalism basis will be addressed in Part III.A., a few words must be said
about the Anti-Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The appellee in Younger had been
indicted by California for a violation of its Criminal Syndicalism Act, a statute held to
be constitutional in 1927 in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, but also a statute which
at the time of Younger in 1971 surely would be held to violate the first amendment in light
of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which overruled Whitney. Seeking to enjoin
his patently improper prosecution, the appellee sought and received relief from a threejudge federal court. The Supreme Court's reversal of that three-judge court could have
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Consistent with the approach of this Part, then, these principles of equity, comity, and "Our Federalism" must be put
through the strainer. Obviously "Our Federalism" will slip
through, warranting further examination in Part II.A. But what
of "equity" and "comity"? These grounds will be analyzed to
demonstrate that to the extent they conjure nonconstitutional
concepts, they do not warrant abstention, and to the extent that
they evoke constitutional concerns, they simply reduce to the
same federalism concepts discussed in the next section.
Equity, the first of the Younger trio, should prompt the most
visceral response. As Justice Brennan said, decisions which prevent one of the sovereign People of the United States from vindicating his constitutional claims in a federal forum "hardly bespeak a true concern for equity."'" Still, for those not content with
emotional reactions, a less instinctive response may be appropriate. Such a response is found in the fallacy of the Younger Court's
statement that "equity should not act, and particularly should
not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party
has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable
2 And
injury if denied equitable relief. ,,1
the fallacy embodied in
this statement is at least three-fold.
Initially, it should be noted that until recently the Younger
Court's assertions with respect to equity were without precedential support. Professor Burton Wechsler's masterful study" of the
precedential bases for Younger ably details his arguments that
"contrary to prevailing mythology, beginning
with the last derelied on the Anti-Injunction Act's prohibition on federal courts enjoining state proceedings except as expressly authorized by an act of Congress. But, perhaps anticipating its
decision in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), sixteen months later, holding that civil
rights actions under section 1983 do fall within the statutory exception to the AntiInjunction Act, the Younger Court neatly stepped around the statutory issue and
grounded its decision on principles of "equity," "comity," and "Our Federalism." 401
U.S. at 43-44. While a discussion of the Mitchum holding is beyond the scope of this
article, the authors wish to note that if federal jurisdiction is to be restricted, then it
should be done by congressional enactment, as by the Anti-Injunction Act, a statute
dating back to 1793 and "reflect[ing] the early view of the proper role of the federal courts
within American federalism"-a view modified by "the Reconstruction statutes, including
the enlargement of federal jurisdiction, [which] represent a later view of American federalism." 401 U.S. at 60-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In any event, given the continued
vitality of the abstention doctrines, "the Mitchum v. Foster decision promises much but
delivers little. Like a perpetually revolving door, it spins civil rights litigants inside while
the centrifugal forces of equity, comity, immunity, and federalism just as quickly spin
them out." K. E. PARKER, MODERN JUDICIAL REMEDIES 112 (1975).
51. Brennan, supra note 1, at 502.
52. 401 U.S. at 43-44.
53. Wechsler, supra note 31.
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cade of the nineteenth century federal trial courts have liberally
exerted their power to invalidate state criminal law and enjoin its
enforcement" 5 4 and that accordingly "Younger misconceived
legal precedents."55
Secondly, and apart from precedent, consider whether the
moving party does have a remedy at law which is adequate.
In Ex parte Young, the Court made short shrift of the
state's argument that contesting the statute's constitutionality
as a defense in a state criminal proceeding constituted an adequate remedy at law, the availability of which barred equitable
relief. The Court noted wryly that "there would not be a crowd
of agents offering to disobey the law," given the possible fine
and imprisonment facing railroad employees who charged more
than the authorized maximum rates [which were being attacked on due process grounds].
Furthermore,
[t]o await proceedings against the company in a state
court grounded upon a disobedience of the act, and then,
if necessary, obtain a review in this court, would place the
company in peril of large loss . . .if it should be finally

This risk the company
determined that the act was valid.
5
ought not to be required to take.

If a corporate entity testing a criminal statute should not be
required to risk a fine by violating that statute and then defending against prosecution on the grounds of the law's unconstitutionality, and if that entity's employees likewise should not be
expected to choose between employment and possible fine or imprisonment, then surely individual citizens should not be re54. Id. at 743.
55. Id. at 744. For the authors' own, less complete examination of the precedential
basis for Younger, an examination which relies heavily on Professor Wechsler's study, see
notes 112-47 and accompanying text infra.
56. Zeigler, supra note 31, at 272, describing and quoting from Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 164, 165 (1908). One sentence from the footnote appearing before this passage
bears reproduction here: "The decision in Ex parte Young has been called 'indispensable
to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law."' Id. at 272 n.31,
'.BOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 186 (2d ed. 1970).
quoting C. WRIGHT, HAND
An alternate, yet equally efficacious, view of the adequate legal remedy issue is found
in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co.,
341 U.S. 341, 359 (1951):
It does not change the significance of the Court's decision to coat it with
the sugar of equity maxims. As we have seen, there is no warrant in the
decisions of this Court for saying that the plaintiff has an "adequate remedy at
law" merely because he may bring suit in the State courts. An "adequate remedy at law," as a bar to equitable relief in the federal courts, refers to a remedy
on the law side of federal courts.
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quired to run the gamut of prosecution to vindicate their constitutional rights! Indeed, the Ex parte Young Court's reasoning with
respect to the inadequacy of the legal remedy retains its practical
vitality today, despite subsequent contrary holdings by the Supreme Court.
Those holdings, beginning with Fenner v. Boykin, 7 carrying
through Douglas v. City of Jeannette,"s and culminating with
Younger itself, shifted the analysis away from the adequacy of the
legal remedy issue and toward the irreparable injury question.
That in itself is not objectionable because the outcome of the
inquiry should remain unchanged: legal hair-splitting aside, if
the legal remedy is inadequate, then the injury is irreparable, and
if the injury is irreparable, then the remedy is inadequate. But
what is objectionable about the later cases is that by focusing on
the irreparable injury question, the Court somehow became prestidigitator. Where equitable principles once did not prevent the
granting of federal relief, they now do!
For example, the Younger Court, hardly mentioning the
issue of the legal remedy and glibly assuming its adequacy,"
claimed that "the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to
defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the special legal sense of that
term." 0 But show someone without a "legal" education this
statement and the statements from Ex parte Young,"' and ask
him to compare them. How would this citizen respond to the
Court's incantation of the "special legal sense" of "injury"?
Would it not surprise him to learn that he does not know what
"irreparable injury" means? Or ask yourself, those of you with
"legal" educations supposedly able to comprehend "special legal
sense[s]," whether the financial and mental strains of having to
defend a prosecution based on a patently unconstitutional statute, as in Younger, are not "irreparable" in any sense! Who
should bear these burdens and inconveniences of making government toe the constitutional line-the popular master or the gov57. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
58. 319 U.S. 157 (1943). Professor Burton Wechsler has demonstrated the fallacies
and "glaring defects" contained in the Douglascase, concluding that the decision has not
"retained precedential vitality throughout the years." Wechsler, supra
note 31, at 814-18.
See notes 127-34 and accompanying text infra, for a more complete discussion of the
Douglas case.
59. 401 U.S. at 44: "[A] single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted."
60. Id. at 46.
61. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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ernmental servant? 62
Hopefully, it is not difficult to see that the Court's reasoning
with respect to the application of "equitable" principles in Ex
parte Young is superior to its legerdemain of later cases. Those
principles simply do not dictate abstention. But even if they did,
then there is yet a third aspect to the fallacy of the Court's use
of "equity" in Younger to destroy jurisdiction. The equitable
principles of adequate legal remedy and irreparable harm may
well yield satisfactory results in contests between two private
parties, or even in nonconstitutional contests between a citizen
and his government, but should they even apply in the same
manner to disputes between one of the sovereign People and his
government when the dispute raises a constitutional question
concerning the civil rights of that sovereign citizen?
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act provides not only for "an action
at law" and a "suit in equity," but also for any "other proper
proceeding for redress." 3 And the jurisdictional grant for civil
rights cases removes the amount in controversy requirement
which otherwise would apply to federal question cases. 4 These
enactments demonstrate Congress's desire to give redress for constitutional wrongs, and not to allow the federal judiciary to withhold that redress at will! 85 At least Congress recognizes that the
governmental servant has little interest in prolonging disputes
with its master, even if the cost of rapidly ending such disputes
is an occasional duplicative proceeding and some friction between
governmental entities." As the only function of government in
62. Of course the very recently enacted Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-559 (Oct. 19, 1976), would relieve some of the financial strain-after the fact.
But who will pay for pre-disposition expenses, and who must bear the mental turmoil?
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
65. Cf. 123 CONG. REc. S201-04 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Mathias).
66. In connection with the disruptive nature of duplicative proceedings, see the discussion of "balancing" the fourteenth amendment against the eleventh in Part M.A. infra.
And with respect to the friction issue and at the risk of again jumping ahead to the subject
of Part III, it here may be appropriate to recall the oft-quoted words of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926):
The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was, not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments,
to save the people from autocracy.
These words were later vindicated in Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935), and one of the themes of Part IIIis the applicability of these sentiments not only
to the separation doctrine, but also to federalism. See text accompanying notes 184-85
infra.
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America is to serve the sovereign People, should the Court
blithely assume that the exact same "equitable" principles applicable to purely private suits apply with equal force in the constitutional realm?
If the federal judiciary is to err, should it not do so in favor
of the master, rather than another servant, the state? After all,
often it is remarked, and with considerable efficacy, that evenhanded uniformity with respect to the application of federal
rights is a desirable product of having a federal judiciary overseeing the states and that federal courts frequently are more sensitive to federal rights than are state courts. 7 Indeed, these observations lie at the very core of Professor Burton Wechsler's
precedent-oriented attack on Younger, an attack replete with citations to, discussions of, and reliances on the primacy of the
federal judiciary."8 In short, these observations should be no less
true today, even though many state courts increasingly are dissatisfied with the restrictive pronouncements of the present Supreme Court and are answering those pronouncements with more
liberal interpretations of their own state constitutions to compensate for the very repression prompting the Civil Rights Improvements Act. 9
67. Cf. Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism, in A NATION OF STATES:
ESSAYS ON THE AMERCAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 24, 32-37 (R.A. Goldwin ed. 1961) (describing

James Madison's arguments in the Constitutional Convention to the effect that a national
government is needed "for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of
Justice"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974); and 123 CONG. REc. S202 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977)
(remarks by Sen. Mathias): "These [Reconstruction] enactments also reflected the belief
of the Congress that the Federal Government-not the individual States-was the primary protector of our basic constitutional freedoms . . . . [T]he authors of this legislative package intended to establish the Federal Government as the fundamental protector
of our constitutional liberties." Professor David Currie also has observed that "the federal
courts, independent of most federal as well as state political pressures, are the most
impartial repository of the power to arbitrate between the states and the nation." Currie,
The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CI. L. REv. 1, 5
(1964).
68. Wechsler, supra note 31, at 744 ("Younger . . . underplayed federal judicial
primacy"), 771-72 ("the federal courts are the 'primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution'"), 839-40 ("The Primacy of the Federal
Judiciary"), 848-57 ("National Law and National Judiciary"), 876-77 ("primary guardians of constitutional rights"), 893-94 ("federal courts have the primary responsibility for
protecting federal rights").
69. See generally Brennan, supra note 1; Comment, Expanding State Constitutional
Protections and the New Silver Platter:After They've Shut the Door, Can They Bar the
Window?, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 186, 195-96 (1976) ("Yet . . . the overwhelming majority of
states [still] defer to the United States Supreme Court even when such deference is
unnecessary."); Lewin, Avoiding the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 17, 1976,
at 31.
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Accordingly, the three-fold recognition that the Court did err
"on the wrong side" in Younger by relying on "equitable principles," principles of doubtful applicability which do not demand
abstention, leads to an examination of federal-state relations, the
subject of Part III.A. But recall that the Younger Court grounded
its abstention pronouncement not only in its erroneous perception
of "equity," as well as in federalism itself, but also in its view of
"comity."
The Court stated that this "notion of 'comity' [consists of]
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free
to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." 70 A
more distorted view of the concept hardly could be imagined!
Any examination of the concept should begin by recognizing
that prior to its distortion it had little to do with constitutional
law but much to do with conflicts law. The renowned Professor
Beale noted the ambiguity which has attached to the use of
"comity" as a general description of the subject called "conflicts
of law," and he attacked the notion that courts base their acceptance of the doctrines of conflicts law on comity rather than on the
legislative, or political, power of the state.' Accordingly, comity
"is for the consideration of the government [i.e., the legislature],
' 72
not of its courts.
An even deeper probe into the nature of comity reveals just
how very different the concept is from that employed by the
Younger Court. Professor Ehrenzweig sketches the origin of the
concept of comity:
The history of conflicts law reflects a struggle between two
tendencies . . . one that we may call unitarian, seeking to resolve or avoid conflict by the assumption of a "super law"; the
other that we may call pluralistic, denying legal character to any
assumed order above each nation's own law . . . . [TIhe outright pluralistic nationalism of the newly born Netherlands...
conceded mere "comity" to other sovereigns.
. . . Dutch legal scholarship, and primarily the writings of
Ulric Huber and Johannes Voet, greatly influenced American
conflicts law, which thus came to reject the imperial "statutist"
70. 401 U.S. at 44.

71. 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE

ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 6.1, at 53-54 (1935).

72. The Nereide, 14 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.).
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heritage of a law "governing" by virtue of its own claim to authority, and to stress mere "comity" as the basis of applying
foreign law.
• . .Citing Huber, Story . . .approved the statement in
Saul v. His Creditors that conflicts law thus "touched the comity of 3nations, and that comity is, and ever must be, uncer7

tain."

So, far from being the compulsive principle warranting reliance by the Younger Court, comity rather was a "no-law,"
merely a civil law conception of the conflicts of law, emerging
from the nationalistic Netherlands to transform an "attitude of
international courtesy" 5 mandating respect for co-equal sovereign nations "into a 'mere comity' which left to each State complete freedom in scrutinizing the findings of foreign courts." 6 In
short, "comity" meant virtually the opposite of what the Younger
Court suggested. And it is not surprising, given this history of the
concept of "comity," that it is most accurately employed not in
cases involving state-to-state or federal-to-state relations, but
rather in cases involving internationalrelations."
Accordingly, the Younger Court's use of "comity" as a basis
for abstention merits at least three criticisms. First, as has just
been explained, the doctrine of "comity" not only signified something quite different from the mandatory principle announced in
Younger, but historically it also is rather inapplicable outside of
the international relations area. Secondly, even if the doctrine
stood for what the Court tried to suggest, and even if it applied
beyond the international area, then still it would be highly erroneous to apply it in cases of federal-state, as opposed to statestate, relations. Where, after all, are the co-equal entities? Finally, even if the first two criticisms fail, then still the Court's
reliance on "comity" to avoid its duty to decide is erroneous. For
just as the "no-law" of comity gave way to, and even facilitated
its own conversion into, the doctrine of vested rights, its universalist opposite" 9-so, too, would any use of "comity" in the
73. A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2-3, at 3-6 (4th ed. 1962).
74. See id. at 4.
75. Id. at 161.
76. Id.
77. Cf., e.g., id. at 12 ("international comity"), 53 ("foreign representatives"), 183
("Courts of foreign countries ... likely to use comity language").
78. As will be stressed again and again in Part HI, in the United States there is only
one sovereign entity-the People! Neither the federal government nor the states can lay
a legitimate claim to sovereignty. See notes 186-93 and accompanying text infra.
79. See EHRENZWEIG-TREATISE supra note 73, at 321.
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federal-state realm necessarily give way to a more rule-bound
pronouncement emboddeterminant, namely the constitutional
80
ied in the supremacy clause.
The supremacy clause, however, reduces "comity" to a matter of federalism. Yet even the Younger Court could not object to
that reduction, because immediately after expounding on its view
of "comity,"'" that Court itself recognized and referred to the
connection: "This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way
to describe it, is referred to by many as 'Our Federalism.' ",82 So
the same thing happens to "comity" as happened to "equity"
when put through the strainer: aspects of nonconstitutional concern are held back for an analysis demonstrating their inadequacy as bases for abstention, while the remaining aspects lead
once more back to the Constitution and its federalistic structural
design.
Thus far, the unfortunate trend away from the federal courts'
duty to decide has been criticized by analysis of the Stone case
in the area of habeas corpus and by analysis of the notions of
"equity" and "comity" in the realm of abstention. Both analyses
left issues of federalism yet to be discussed in Part III. But, the
holistic nature of the trend has yet to be explored satisfactorily,
for several aspects of the problem still demand attention. These
aspects bear a real relationship to the trend being attacked, because they have contributed significantly to it, but they nevertheless do not merit the same type of criticism as presented above,
as they are found in the quite constitutional enactments of Congress. Indeed, the analysis of these congressional enactments will
introduce the relevance of the "other" structural protection examined in Part III-the separation of powers. For not only do the
enactments and policies of Congress address federal-state relations, but they also illustrate the interactions between the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government. The particular enactments to be discussed were reactions to a decision
deemed by many to be necessary to constitutional government in
America, 83 but they also had the unfortunate side-effect of making the judicial field fertile for such weeds as abstention. Before
describing the relationship between the grass and the weeds, however, the seminal decision must be examined.
80.
81.
82.
83.

U.S. CONST. art. Vi, § 2.
See text accompanying note 70 supra.
401 U.S. at 44.
See note 56 supra.
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In 1908 the Supreme Court planted the seed for later confusion when it ushered in a new era in the relationship between the
states and the federal judiciary with its decision in the landmark
case of Ex parte Young.8 4 No longer need a federal court look
behind the named parties when asked to prevent a state official
from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. A suit
against a state officer to enjoin him from enforcing a state statute
alleged to be unconstitutional was not to be considered a suit
against the state itself for purposes of the eleventh amendment.
Enforcement of the challenged statute would be considered "state
action," however, for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
The case arose when stockholders of nine railroads brought
an action in federal court to enjoin the railroads from complying
with a recently enacted law reducing railroad rates and imposing
severe penalties for noncompliance. The court also was asked to
restrain another named defendant, Edward T. Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, from enforcing the new rate law. The
plaintiffs claimed that enforcement of the reduced rate schedule
would deprive them of their property contrary to the due process
provisions of the fourteenth amendment, and also that the penalties for noncompliance were so severe that the railroads, if not
restrained, would comply with it. The federal court issued a preliminary injunction restraining Attorney General Young from enforcing the new rate law. The following day Young sought a writ
of mandamus in a state court to compel the railroads to comply
with the law. For this action he was adjudged in contempt by the
federal court, fined $100, and ordered to jail until he dismissed
the state proceeding.
Young then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. As the Court perceived the issue, Young was entitled
to the writ if the injunction against him was prohibited by the
eleventh amendment. The Court held the eleventh amendment
did not prohibit such an injunction, and Young's attempt to enforce a state law in the face of a preliminary finding that the law
was unconstitutional was held to be "simply an illegal act upon
the part of a state official." 5 The Court continued:
[I]f the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce
be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped
84. 209 U.S. 123.
85. Id. at 159.
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of his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State
has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States.8"
The reaction to Ex parte Young drew federal-state relations
into sharp conflict.8 7 Railroads and utilities were quick to challenge state regulatory policies in federal courts. Often they were
successful in having temporary restraining orders issued ex parte,
and interlocutory injunctions were sometimes issued on the basis
of affidavits only and without formal hearings. These
"temporary" orders tied up enforcement of some state regulatory
and tax measures for long periods of time, often without any
decision on the merits.M
The discretion vested in judges of the lower federal courts
was practically unfettered, and there was widespread belief that
this discretion was being exercised unwisely. Particularly objectionable was the fact that this discretion-which could be exercised to prohibit the principal law officer of a state from resorting to state courts for enforcement of state statutes-resided in
single judges."'
The resentment of the states was reflected by their representatives in the halls of Congress. There were proposals to eliminate
the jurisdiction of federal courts over suits challenging state
laws .90

Significantly, Congress chose not to strip the lower federal
courts of jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of unconstitutional
state laws. Instead, in 1910 Congress enacted a bill forbidding
issuance of a federal interlocutory injunction against enforcement
of unconstitutional state statutes except by a district court composed of three judges, at least one of whom would be a judge of
the then-Circuit Courts of Appeals. The bill also provided for
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from an order "granting or
denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory injunction in
such cases."' 1
The 1910 statute was later amended to include cases seeking
injunction against enforcement of administrative orders made
86. Id. at 159-60.
87. C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 146 (1972).
88. Id. at 147. See also Comment, Limitation of Lower Court Jurisdictionover Public
Utility Rate Cases, 44 YALE L.J. 119, 121-22 (1934).
89. JACOBS, supra note 87, at 147.
90. Currie, supra note 67, at 6-7.
91. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557.
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under the authority of state statutes, and in 1925 it was again
amended to require three judges for the hearing on a permanent
injunction as well as on the application for an interlocutory injunction. In 1948 the statute was codified as section 2281 of the
Judicial Code. 2
Thus, the reaction of Congress to the federal court's intervention in Ex parte Young was not to curtail the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, but rather to change the method by which their
jurisdiction could be exercised. Three judges would lend more
dignity to a federal trial court decision invalidating state legislation. As stated by Senator Overman, who "opposed. .. allowing
one little federal judge to stand up against the governor and the
legislature and the attorney general of the State": "[I]f three
judges declare that a state statute is unconstitutional the people
would rest easy under" that declaration. 3 Furthermore, by allowing direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the statute would assure
an authoritative response should the three judges erroneously
strike down a state statute.
Many southern congressmen, subject to a long tradition of
opposing federal judicial authority, as well as congressmen from
the western states, would have imposed greater reforms. However, even the rather limited reform embodied in the Three-Judge
Court Act passed by a very thin margin in the Senate. Thus,
Congress implicitly acquiesced in Ex parte Young's sanction of
the asserted authority of the federal judiciary. 4
It should be emphasized that the congressional response to
Young came at a time when Senate membership was chosen by
the various state legislatures, 5 and thus could be expected to be
extremely sensitive to the desires of those deliberative bodies.
And yet the deference or courtesy (call it comity if you will)
shown by Congress to the state legislatures merely made it more
cumbersome for the federal trial bench to overturn state laws.
Access to federal district courts for litigants seeking redress
against unconstitutional state laws was not diminished by congressional enactment of the Three-Judge Court Act. That Act and
its subsequent amendments were merely procedural modifications; they did not restrict the power of federal district courts to
restrain enforcement of state laws.
92. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at § 50.
93. 45 CONG. REC. 7256 (1910).
94. JACOBS, supra note 87, at 148-49.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The seventeenth amendment providing for popular
election of the Senate was ratified on April 8, 1913.
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It was not until more than two decades after the Young decision that Congress finally chose to shield some state laws from
scrutiny by lower federal courts. The Johnson Act of 193411 deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the operation
of, or compliance with, any order of a state agency or local ratemaking body fixing rates for a public utility when the four conditions of the act are met; the Tax Injunction Act of 193711 forbids
district court injunctions against "the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law." Neither of these acts becomes
operative unless there is a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in
the state courts. 8 Confined as they are to the areas of taxation
and public utility rates, these two statutes would not seem to
warrant federal court refusals to act in other types of cases."
Given these limited congressional responses to Ex parte
Young, it is rather difficult to see how the Younger doctrine can
be a reflection of congressional policy. Indeed, since the Civil War
the policy of Congress has been in the direction of providing the
citizenry with a federal forum as an alternative to state courts for
the determination of rights, privileges, and immunities under federal law. The strongest expression of that post-war congressional
policy is found in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,10 recently characterized by the Supreme Court as
a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century when the antiinjunction statute was enacted. [In fact], [tihe very purpose
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970):
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or
compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and
made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of
the order to the Federal Constitution; and,
(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and,
(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and,
(4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State.
[Act of May 14, 1934, 48 Stat. 775.]
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970): "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." [Act of Aug. 21, 1937, 50 Stat.
738.1
98. See notes 96 and 97 supra.
99. But see Trainor v. Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. 1911, 1918-19 n.8 (1977), where the Court
cites the Tax Injunction Act in support of abstention when a district court had been asked
to review the constitutionality of an attachment proceeding unrelated to any state tax law.
100. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
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of section 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under
color of state law, "whether that action be executive, legislative,
or judicial."' 0'

Other examples of the congressional policy of providing a federal
forum to resolve questions of federal law include the general federal question statute, 0 passed in 1875; the expansion of jurisdic0 3 and the 1948
tion to remove cases from state to federal courts;
04
amendment to the Anti-Injunction Statute.
Yet although Congress has tended to expand the subject
matter jurisdiction of lower federal courts over questions of federal law, the Supreme Court has tended to give narrow readings
to the legislation. The general federal question statute 5 has been
saddled with the ridiculous rule that the federal question must
appear in the "well-pleaded complaint,"'0 ° and a similar fate
befell the removal provision. 07 In fact, the "separate and inde101. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1879).
102. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)).
103. See WRIGHT, supra note 31, at § 38.
104. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)).
The previous version of the statute had been given a restrictive interpretation by the Court
in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). The 1948 amendment was a
"Congressional overruling" of the holding in Toucey.
In Toucey, the plaintiff was seeking to enjoin litigation in a state court of a dispute
already finally adjudicated in a federal court. An injunction of the state court proceeding
would have saved "the defendants in the state proceedings the inconvenience of pleading
and proving res judicata." 314 U.S. at 129. The Court ruled that the federal injunction
was prohibited. With the 1948 amendment, Congress "ruled" to the contrary. Compare
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The reader is invited to ponder the difference
between the inconvenience of "pleading and proving res judicata" on the one hand, and
"the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution" on the other. Congress has authorized federal court injunctions to avoid the first
of these inconveniences; the Court denies them for the latter!
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
106. Perhaps the best example of this absurd rule is the case of the hapless Mottleys.
See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), and the subsequent state court
litigation which culminated when the federal questions (which were all that were at issue)
finally were decided on the merits in Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
107. Act of March 3, 1875, § 2, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a)-(b)
(1970)). (Note that Congress enacted the removal provision and the general federal question statute at the same time.) The well-pleaded complaint rule was applied in GoldWashing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
In fact, were it not for the "well-pleaded complaint rule," the requests for injunctions
against the state court proceedings in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977); and Trainor v. Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977),
would not have been necessary because those cases would have been eligible for removal
to the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) (1970).
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pendent claim" provision of the general removal statute' 5 has
been given such a narrow construction that it might as well not
0 and it is a rare case that qualifies for
exist for diversity cases,'1
removal under the civil rights removal statute"0 as interpreted by
the Court."' Giving a narrow interpretation to jurisdictional statutes is one thing: the Younger abstention doctrine, however, is
quite another. Not only is the Younger doctrine unsupported by
congressional policy, it flies in the face of it! Moreover, as we shall
attempt to persuade the reader in Part III of this article, the
doctrine is unconstitutional. But before proceeding to constitutional objections to the Younger doctrine, allow the authors to
examine the legitimacy of abstention, Younger style, from a precedential point of view. Then further allow them to speculate as
to the "real" factors that may have prompted the Court to create
the doctrine.
The Supreme Court grounded its holding in Younger upon
six cases decided during the years spanning 1926 to 1943. With
one exception, those cases involved attempts by plaintiffs to enjoin state officials from enforcing statutes designed to regulate
business activity through the imposition of criminal (misdemeanor) sanctions."' From those cases the Court extracted "the
settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the
of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecuavailability
3
tions.''''
In truth, there never were any such "settled doctrines." Professor Wechsler demonstrates that fact rather conclusively in his
devastatingly brilliant attack on the Younger doctrine."' As he
shows us, lip service has long been paid to the "general rule" that
equity will not interfere with a state criminal prosecution. How108. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
109. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951), discussed in WRIGHT,
supra note 31, at § 39.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).
111. See 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3728 (1976).
112. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926) (regulating trade in cotton futures); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (regulating sale of automobiles); Beal
v. Missouri P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) (regulating train crews); Watson v. Buck, 313
U.S. 387 (1941) (prohibiting combination in restraint of trade); Williams v. Miller, 317
U.S. 599 (1942) (requiring license for building contractors). In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), the challenged ordinance prohibited solicitation of orders for
merchandise without a license, but it was being used to prosecute the federal court plaintiffs for distributing religious literature.
113. 401 U.S. at 53.
114. Wechsler, supra note 31.
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ever, in actual practice, when the constitutionality of a state
statute has been challenged, the "general rule" has been the exception and the exceptions have been the general rule.
From 1888 to 1939, a period of 51 years, out of dozens of
Supreme Court cases, just two, Fenner [v. Boykin] and
Spielman [Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge],"' denied federal equity
a role when state criminal law was at war with the Constitution.
Only the language about the "rule" and the "exception" obscured this remarkable history. The risk inherent in testing
criminal law through breach and prosecution provided the
raison d'tre for the civil remedy. The unique role of the federal
judiciary as expositor and defender of constitutional rights justified its prominent participation in the process."'
The Court frequently stated the "general rule" in its opinions,
but Fenner and Spielman were the only cases in over five decades
of decisions where the rule was actually put into practice. Those
two cases, together with four others decided during World War II,
would become the foundation for the Younger doctrine.
It was in 1941 that the phantom "general rule" was resurrected in Beal v. MissouriPacific R. Co. 7 and Watson v. Buck. 8
But Beal was a diversity case and did not involve any question
of constitutional law. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against
prosecution, alleging they were in compliance with the statute
under which they were being threatened. In effect, they were
asking the federal court, in the absence of any federal question,
to interpret a state statute that had not been reviewed by the
state courts. And in Watson, after paying lip service to the
''general rule," the Court went on to hold that a key provision of
the challenged statute did "not contravene the [federal] copyright laws or the Federal Constitution.""' 9 As to the other portions
of the statutes, the Court found "a complete lack of record evidence or information of any other sort to show any threat to
prosecute the complainants or any one else."'' 0 Is it any wonder,
then, that the Court reversed the issuance of the injunction that
had been decreed by the lower court? Given that Beal did not
115. See note 112 supra.
116. Wechsler, supra note 31, at 798-99.
117. 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
118. 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
119. Id. at 405. If the Court did not "hold" § 1 of the Florida statute constitutional,
we must conclude Justice Black was rendering an advisory opinion in which Justice
Frankfurter and the other Justices concurred.
120. Id. at 399.
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involve a constitutional question and that Watson decided on the
merits the validity of the only provision under which a threat of
prosecution was perceived, it is hard to see how those cases lend
support to the doctrine announced in Younger.
Professor Wechsler provides another explanation as to why
Beal and Watson are not sound precedent for Younger. He theorizes that those two cases were merely part of the process of closing the door on the notion of substantive due process.' This may
well be true for, as he points out, on the same day the Court
decided Beal, it affirmed an injunction against enforcement of a
state alien registration act in Hines v. Davidowitz.22 "Neither the
district court nor Supreme Court opinions in Hines disclosed any
threats on the part of public officials to prosecute.'

' 2

Perhaps the

"general rule" against injunctions was not so general after all.
The fifth case cited by the Court in support of its Younger
decision was Williams v. Miller,2 a suit challenging the constitutionality of a California contractor-licensing statute. A threejudge district court had dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
because there was no allegation raising a substantial constitutional question.'215 The Supreme Court affirmed "on the ground
that the bill does not allege facts which would warrant the granting of equitable relief by a federal court to restrain enforcement
of the state statute.

12 8

The brief per curiam opinion then cited

Beal, Watson, and Spielman without further comment. Hardly a
bedrock decision.
The final, and perhaps best known, precedent cited by the
Younger Court as representing the "general rule" against enjoining state criminal proceedings was Douglasv. City of Jeannette."7
It was the only case among the six that involved the first amendment. The city had convicted members of a religious sect for
selling their literature door-to-door without having paid a license
tax. Other members of the sect were being threatened with prosecution for the same reason. While those convicted were appealing,
these other members sought injunctive relief against further prosecutions. The state appellate court upheld the convictions, 28 but
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Wechsler, supra note 31, at 799-813.
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Wechsler, supra note 31, at 809.
317 U.S. 599 (1942).
Williams v. Miller, 48 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Cal. 1942).
317 U.S. at 599.
319 U.S. 157 (1943).
Commonwealth v. Murdock, 149 Pa. Super. 175, 27 A.2d 666 (1942).
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a federal district court enjoined city officials from further enforcement of the ordinance.'29 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed the district court on the merits.'30 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari in both cases and decided
them as companions. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,'"' the Court
reversed the state criminal convictions on the ground that the city
ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court then affirmed the
court of appeals in the federal injunction suit in Douglas on two
grounds. The Court found no reason to believe that the city would
not "acquiesce in the decision of [the] Court holding the challenged ordinance unconstitutional as applied to petitioners."' 32 In
view of the decision it had just rendered in Murdock there was
"no ground for supposing that the intervention of a federal court,
in order to secure petitioners' constitutional rights, [would] be
either necessary or appropriate."' 33
The holding in Murdock was reason enough to refuse the
requested injunction in Douglas. However, the Court also gave
another reason, invoking the "familiar rule that courts of equity
do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions."' 34 The cases of
Fenner, Spielman, Beal, Watson, and Williams were duly cited
to buttress the "familiar rule," and so Douglas became precedent
that the Court would draw on twenty-eight years later in
Younger.
Starting with Beal and ending with Douglas, the Court thus
had invoked the "general rule" that equity will not ordinarily
enjoin state criminal prosecutions four times in a period of less
than twenty-eight months. Perhaps the "general rule," which had
really been the exception,' 35 actually had become the general rule.
And so it had, for forty-two whole days, until the Court upheld
the decree of a three-judge district court enjoining enforcement
of a regulation of the West Virginia State Board of Education
requiring children in public schools to salute the American flag.'3
The challenged regulation was backed by criminal sanctions, and
parents of children refusing to salute the flag had been prosecuted
while others had been threatened with prosecution for "causing
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 39 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Pa. 1941).
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 130 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1942).
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
319 U.S. at 165.
Id.
Id. at 163.
See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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delinquency.' 37 The opinion of the Court made no mention of the
"general rule."
Had the Court forgotten the "general rule" after only six
short weeks? Apparently they had because, as Professor Wechsler
points out: "Younger was the first Supreme Court case in 28 years
' 38
to invoke the moribund Beal-Watson abstention doctrine.'
"During that 28-year period between Douglas and Younger, the
Court steadfastly refused to invoke Beal-Watson in at least 25
cases." 139 It is true that most of those cases did not involve injunctions against pending criminal proceedings, but then neither did
five of the six cases cited in support of the holding in Younger,
and in the sixth case, Douglas, proceedings were pending against
some plaintiffs, but not against others.' 4
It accordingly appears that, prior to Younger, the "general
rule" forbidding injunctions against state criminal proceedings
was the "rule" only from 1941 to 1943.14' Even then, with the
exception of Douglas, in which the need for an injunction had
disappeared, 2 the rule was invoked only in cases involving economic regulations. Of those three cases, one did not involve a
federal question of any kind;4 3 in another the constitutional question was decided on the merits;' and the third was a per curiam
opinion from which very little can be gleaned.'
In fact, during the subsequent years between 1943 and 1971,
the "general rule" was laid to rest soundly and the injunctive
powers of the federal courts were put to the work Congress had
intended when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871. A "Second
Reconstruction" took place. Integration of the schools started;
federal injunctions struck down state criminal laws compelling
blacks to ride in the backs of buses; and the right to associate
freely in the cause of civil rights was vindicated. 4 ' Many of the
cases of that era, including one of those consolidated in Brown v.
137. Id. at 630.
138. Wechsler, supra note 31, at 866.
139. Id. at 866 n.562. Professor Wechsler lists the cases in his footnote for those who
wish to count them.
140. Id. at 817 n.320.
141. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926), and Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
295 U.S. 89 (1935), were isolated instances of application of the "general rule" during the
decades in which they were decided.
142. See text accompanying notes 127-33 supra.
143. Beal v. Missouri P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
144. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
145. Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942).
146. See Wechsler, supra note 31, at 822-26.
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Board of Education,'47 involved state criminal laws, but that did
not deter the Court. Beal, Watson, and Douglas became the exception in practice.
What was it, then, that prompted the Court to revive this
not-so-general "general rule" in 1971? Why did the Court, in
effect, remove the lower federal courts from their role as the primary enforcers of the Civil Rights Act? Why were precedents
involving economic regulations with misdemeanor sanctions suddenly used to deny a federal court injunction to a man facing a
felony charge and a possible fourteen year prison term under a
state statute that clearly violated the first amendment? What
motivated the Court to decide Younger the way it did?
We know that the announced motives were equity, comity,
and "Our Federalism." Was there another? We think so, and,
although it involves a good deal of speculation and conjecture,
shall endeavor to explain.
A commentator recently stated that, "[in a sense, Younger
is a child of You.ng. ", We prefer to think of Younger as the
illegitimate grandchild of Young. A grandchild because Ex parte
Young gave birth to the Three-Judge Court Act,"19 and we
strongly suspect it was the Three-Judge Court Act that gave birth
to Younger; moreover, as we contend in Part HI of this article, the
birth was illegitimate because it contravened the Constitution.
Recall that, in enacting the Three-Judge Court Act, Congress
did not reduce the power of lower federal courts under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 50 But the act did place the burden of
paying deference to the states on the federal judiciary by requiring three judges to enjoin enforcement of state laws. Federal
courts did not shoulder this new burden without complaint. Justice Frankfurter once described the Three-Judge Court Act "not
as a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great
liberality, but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the
term and to be applied as such."'' By saying this, Justice Frankfurter helped to make it so, and his dictum was often quoted as
the Court spewed forth an increasingly complex body of precedent interpreting the act.'52
147. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The consolidated case was Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951).
148. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. CoLo. L. REv. 139,
174 (1977). The references are to Younger v. Harris and Ex parte Young.
149. See text accompanying notes 87-95 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
151. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
152. See the second edition of C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 50 (1970).
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It is easy to understand why the courts did not like the act.
It was frequently difficult, particularly in less populated areas, to
summon a second district judge and a judge of the court of appeals.'5 3 The rules relating to appellate review were so complex
that it was often difficult to tell whether an appeal was to go to
the court of appeals or to the Supreme Court. Prudent attorneys
filed appeals in both courts in doubtful cases. Perhaps the most
significant problem with the act, for purposes of this discussion,
was that it provided for direct appeal from the district court to
the Supreme Court in many cases. This was "contrary to the
general scheme giving that Court substantial control over its own
docket."' 54 Despite these docket-oriented burdens, Professor
David Currie, writing in 1964, observed that "[w]hen the actual
extent of the burden on the federal courts is considered, the price
for the palliative does not seem too high."' 5 Indeed, in 1964 there
were only twenty-one civil rights cases invoking the jurisdiction
of three-judge federal courts, and in the previous year there had
been only nineteen such cases.'56
But in 1965 the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
the case of Dombrowski v. Pfister'57 and thereafter came a dramatic upsurge in the number of civil rights cases before threejudge federal courts. The year 1966 saw a doubling of the 1963-64
average of twenty cases per year. In 1969 there were eighty-one
such cases, and the following year that number had doubled.158
In Dombrowski the Court held that a three-judge court had
erred in refusing to grant injunctive relief against a threatened
state criminal prosecution said to have a "chilling effect" on the
constitutional right of freedom of expression of civil rights workers in Louisiana. Justice Brennan's "partially vague opinion"
generated a "wave" of petitions, most presented to three-judge
courts."'
The six-year period from 1964 to 1970 thus had produced an
eightfold increase in the number of three-judge cases, and the
effect on the Supreme Court's docket was telling. In 1972 Chief
Justice Burger called for the total elimination of three-judge
153. WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 50 at 213.

154. Id.
155. Currie, supra note 67, at 12.
156. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR

OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1975, at 229.

157. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
158. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note .156, at 229.
159. Maraist, FederalInjunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings:The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REv. 535, 580 (1970).
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courts, complaining that "appeals from three-judge district
courts now account for one of five cases heard by the Supreme
Court."" ° The Court had lost its discretionary control over a substantial portion of its own docket. Although three-judge court
cases amounted to less than three percent of all cases docketed
in the Court, they consumed a disproportionate amount of time
for argument. "In the period from October, 1969, through November, 1971, the Court heard argument of 366 cases. Of these, 80,
or 22 percent, were from three-judge courts."''
In 1976 Congress heeded the call of the Chief Justice and
eliminated the requirement of a three-judge court in all but a few
categories of cases,6 2 virtually eliminating the numerical burden
plaguing the Supreme Court. A three-judge court is now mandated only when otherwise required by an act of Congress or when
an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or of any statewide legislative
63
body.1
The diminished three-judge court requirement thus should
no longer present many problems for the federal judiciary. But
the Younger doctrine is still present, bigger and broader than
ever. It has been expanded to preclude federal injunctions in civil
action; it extends to certain activities of state executive officers
not involving state court proceedings; and although the Court has
held that Younger does not preclude declaratory relief when no
state proceedings are pending, state prosecutors nevertheless can
now avoid the possibility of an adverse declaratory judgment by
prompt initiation of criminal proceedings after the federal declaratory suit has been filed!
Consider such actions by state prosecutors more fully. While
most of the case precedent relied on in Younger did not involve
pending criminal proceedings,' the Court has held that when
there is no state proceeding, considerations of equity, comity, and
federalism have "little vitality' 0' 1 5 and that "federal declaratory
relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and
a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement
of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an attack is made
160. S. REP. No. 94-204, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1988, 1990.
161. Id. at 5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1992.
162. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
163. The "otherwise required" provision is discussed in WIGwr, supra note 31, § 50
at 214.
164. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
165. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
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6
on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied."'
Hence, it may be appropriate for the district court to issue a
preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo while the court
7
considers whether to grant declaratory relief." Such a preliminary injunction could be crucial in avoiding abstention because
equity, comity, and federalism apparently regain their vitality
and even declaratory relief is precluded if the state prosecutor
commences his criminal action while the federal litigation is still
in an "embryonic state."'" 8 Thus, the state can invoke Younger
and avoid the possibility of an adverse declaratory judgment by
making a dash to file its charge with the state criminal court
shortly after commencement of the federal action. If the door of
the state courthouse is reached before the federal court has any
"proceedings of substance on the merits," whatever they may be,
9
the state wins the game and the federal court must abstain.'
Track shoes may become a part of every well-dressed state prosecutor's wardrobe.
In Rizzo v. Goode,'10 the Court further extended the Younger
doctrine beyond state criminal proceedings to shield members of
an executive agency of state government from federal injunctive
power. But this was hardly surprising because the Court already
had abandoned the requirement of a criminal proceeding.
Recall that it was a "general rule" of equity that forbade
injunctions against criminal proceedings. In Younger, the Court
also invoked comity and "Our Federalism" in aid of equity. Having built up a new set of precedent, the Court could afford to drop
the "equitable" principle, which applied only to criminal proceedings, and concentrate on comity and federalism for venturing
into state civil proceedings. In a series of cases beginning with
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,' 7 the Court invoked the concepts of
comity and federalism to justify abstention where state civil proceedings were pending. Despite existing subject matter jurisdiction in Huffman, the Court held that the district court "should
not have entertained this action . . . unless [plaintiff] estab166. Id. at 475. However, according to Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice, a
declaratory judgment might not aid the federal plaintiff if the state decides to prosecute
in spite of an adverse declaratory judgment. Id. at 478-85 (concurring opinion).
167. The Court so held in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975).
168. Id. at 927.
169. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
170. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
171. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See also Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977).
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lished that early intervention was justified under one of the exceptions recognized in Younger. "7
Exceptions to Younger, however, are hard to come by, as the
Court recently demonstrated in another case involving a state
civil proceeding. A state agency had filed an attachment complaint resulting in attachment of the federal plaintiffs' funds in
a credit union without affording the plaintiffs a hearing. Claiming
that the state attachment statute violated the principles established by recent Supreme Court cases, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a three-judge district court and
were granted an injunction.'7 3 On appeal it was urged that the
case was an exception which the Younger opinion allowed in cases
where a state statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph,and in whatever manner and against whomever an
effort might be made to apply it. " Because the district court
had merely found that "the challenged statute is patently and
flagrantly violative of the constitution,"'7 5 the Younger exception
was held not to apply. Is a patent and flagrant violation not
enough?
Where will all of this abstention end? How far will the Court
go in deciding that lower federal courts should not decide cases,
even where Congress has accorded them jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit? These are questions we cannot answer.
Decisions not to decide seem to be the current vogue. One recent
case does not meet any of the current abstention doctrines", and,
as far as we know, has yet to be branded with a doctrinal label.
We discuss the case, not because it relates to the Younger doctrine, but rather as a further indication of what we consider to be
an undesirable, indeed dangerous, trend toward abdication of the
duty to decide cases falling within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
There is a well known rule of law counseling courts to yield
jurisdiction in an in rem action when another court has first acquired jurisdiction of the res. Now picture, if you will, a state
court seizing control of the mighty Colorado River. You say it
172. 420 U.S. at 611.
173. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
174. Trainor v. Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. at 1920.
175. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 760.
176. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
The three abstention doctrines, Pullman, Burford, and Younger, are described by the
Court at 814-17.
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could never happen? We agree, and yet it is on this analogy that
we are supposed to accept relinquishment of jurisdiction in the
case of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States.77 As Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
the district court had jurisdiction, a related act of Congress did
not diminish that jurisdiction, and none of the abstention doctrines justified dismissal of the case. Nevertheless, a majority of
the Court upheld dismissal by the district court! Let the state
courts decide. Never mind that Congress has chosen to give the
litigants the alternative of choosing a federal forum.
Is it proper for the federal courts, having been chosen as a
forum, to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction granted by
Congress for reasons manufactured by the Court? We think not.
Examination of nonconstitutional concepts fails to support the
trend away from the duty to decide. Furthermore, when the
courts refuse to exercise jurisdiction granted by Congress, they
violate an ancient doctrine that pervades our Constitution-the
doctrine of separation of powers. For as the Supreme Court recognized 132 years ago, it is Congress which possesses the sole power
to define and delimit the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. 78
The courts are not empowered to make such political decisions.
But before proceeding to our analysis of such constitutional issues, a brief summary of this Part is in order.
Our examination of Congress's responses to Ex parte Young,
together with the federal judiciary's reactions to Congress's responsive enactments, culminates in Younger, the most familiar
manifestation of the federal courts' door-closing trend. This examination accordingly serves to demonstrate further the complexities of and interrelations among the myriad components of
the increasingly pervasive problem of federal courts refusing to
exercise their jurisdiction. Moreover, the circularity established
by the congressional and judicial responses reaching their climax
in Younger further heightens our sense of the holistic nature of
the problem, as well as our recognition that the true crux of the
177. Id.
178. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845):
[Tihe judicial power of the United States . . . is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and
organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of
Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the
Supreme Court) . . . and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited,
concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact
degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.
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problem lies in the Court's (mis)perceptions of two constitutionally-embodied structural protections-federalism and separation
of powers. For just as the earlier analysis of Stone and the nonconstitutional elements of abstention reduced those manifestations
of the trend to issues of federalism, so too did the later analysis
of Ex parte Young, the congressional responses to it, and the
judiciary's reactions to those responses demonstrate that those
aspects of the problem also reduce to issues of federalism and
separation of powers. All roads indeed do lead back to the Constitution! And it is the purpose of Part III to show that the constitutional elements of federalism and separated powers, rather than
justifying the federal courts' refusal to decide cases, in fact establish the duty of those courts to decide those cases where Congress
has granted jurisdiction and created a cause of action. In order
to depict the ground covered by Part II and to anticipate the
conclusions of Part III, the flow diagram on the next page suggests
one visual conceptualization of "the duty to decide."
Ill.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORE OF THE PROBLEM

Having filtered out and discounted nonconstitutional contributors to the trend toward refusals to decide, the argument now
can focus on the real crux of the problem-the Court's misuse of
"Our Federalism" as an excuse for avoiding decisions, as well as
its ignoring the doctrine of separated powers as a mandate to the
federal judiciary to decide cases. The core of the problem accordingly becomes simplified. As Congress has been given the power
to create jurisdiction in the federal courts, it simply is not within
those courts' province to destroy that jurisdiction by refusing to
decide cases, whatever nonjurisdictional nomenclature is used to
describe the practice: such refusals violate the separation of powers doctrine. Were that the only thrust of the constitutional argument, however, one could hypothesize that the practice is nevertheless acceptable. For if federalism admonishes the federal
courts to refuse to decide, while separated powers counsels
against such refusals, then one could suggest that courts should
be free to justifiably choose vindication of federalism over strict
adherence to separated powers. But the thrust of the constitutional argument does not rest solely with separated powers, and
so that hypothesis would be false. For as Justice Brennan aptly
asserts: "Federalism need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that
serves only to limit the scope of human liberty."' 79
179. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503.
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Federalism is not a sword to be used against the individual citizen, a sword to guard the closed doors of federal courthouses, a
sword to deprive the individual of his ability to present and vindicate his constitutional rights in a federal forum. No, indeed! Fed-
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eralism, rather, should be conceptualized as a structural arrangement embodied in the Constitution as a protector of that citizen
in addition to the structural safeguards afforded by fractionalized
powers. In short, courts should use both federalism and separation of powers as protective facilitators of individual rights and
liberties.
This dual protective scheme is one of the major themes running throughout Part Ill. It is a theme permeating the literature.
Professor Dorsen of New York University observes that although
federalism and the separation doctrine "both . . . are customarily viewed as structural arrangements for the allocation of governmental authority, they are also deeply rooted in the need to enhance personal liberty."'' " And Dean Strong, long known for his
study of and the distinctions he draws between the "indirect"
structural safeguards embodied in the Constitution and the more
"direct" due process-type protections,'"' recently noted that
James Madison in fact articulated this kinship of federalism and
separated powers:
[I]n the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.'812
In much of what follows his quote, Dean Strong decries the recent
insensitivity to federalism's original purpose "as a device of indirect limitation operating for the benefit of the individual.' ' 13
Indeed, in the passage immediately following his quote from
Madison, Dean Strong prompts recognition of a second and re180. Dorsen, Separation of Powers and Federalism, Two Doctrines with a Common
Goal: Confining Arbitrary Authority, 41 ALBaw L. REv. 53 (1977).
181. See generally Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of
Administrative-ConstitutionalLaw, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 111 (1967).
182. Strong, Court vs. Constitution:DisparateDistortionsof the Indirect Limitations
in the American Constitutional Framework, 54 N.C. L. Rav. 125, 125-26 (1976) (quoting
Madison).
183. Id. at 136; see also, e.g., id. at 130 ("disregarding the . . . function [of the
indirect limitations] as affording protection of the individual against governmental intrusion upon guaranteed private right"), 133 ("The clear concern is for the state as a polity,
not for a division of governmental powers in the interest of indirect protection for individual rights"), 136 ("Absent is the traditional conception of federalism as dividing the
spheres of national and state authority to effectuate the limitation of power that would
thereby flow derivatively for the benefit of the individual. It is now a matter of the states'
defense of their own political integrity"), 137 ("the emphasis is on protection of the state,
not the individual").
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lated major theme which flows throughout Part III. This theme
asserts the desirability of friction between state and national governments, rather than the necessity of avoiding such friction, as
postulated by the door-closing decisions which eschew the duty
to decide:
The manner in which "security arises" from these power distributions has never been more vividly explained than by Justice
Louis Brandeis in his celebrated dissent in Myers v. United
States. Referring to the doctrine of separation of powers he
stressed that its incorporation into the basic structure of the
Constitution of 1787 was "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to
avoid friction but, by means of the inevitable friction incident
to the distributionof the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."
. . .Both federalism and separationof powers achieve protection of the individual from Government Unlimited as a byproduct of the friction induced by articulated power allocations
in the structure of government.'84
And Professor Dorsen echoes these thoughts: "Here we return to
first principles-that separation of powers and federalism are,
intrinsically, the instruments of neither efficiency nor effectiveness, but rather means to assure liberty."' 8 5 Thus, like subservient gladiators in the arena, each seeking life-and-death approval from his masters, the state and federal governments
should not avoid friction and conflict; rather, friction should be
encouraged, so that the popular sovereign can judge intelligently
the performances of each. The refusal of one gladiator, here the
federal judiciary, to perform for its masters simply will not do.
Reference to the People as sovereign masters evokes yet a
third and final related major theme permeating the ensuing analysis. That theme is the tremendous significance of constantly
recognizing the People of the United States as the only sovereigns
in this country. 86 More than lip-service must be paid to this
essential foundation of American Constitutionalism!
William Anderson, one scholar who pays proper deference to
the concept of popular sovereignty, begins his analysis by explaining that:
184. Id. at 126-27 (emphasis added).
185. Dorsen, supra note 180, at 70.
186. See generally Abrahams & Snowden, supra note 29, especially at 22-31. For a
detailed discussion of popular sovereignty as "the most novel and crucial American innovation in political thought," see id. at 22, and as "the cornerstone for an adequate understanding of separation of powers in the American Constitution," see id. at 29.
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[t]he authority behind the Articles of Confederation was an
agreement among the thirteen state legislatures, each acting for
its own state ....
There is no mention of the people of the United States. The
Articles did not depend upon or receive any popular sanction or
approval. Instead it was the legislatures as the governing bodies
of their respective states that authorized the whole procedure
and approved the document as an agreement among themselves. I

But whereas "[tihe Congress under the Articles was a mere
superstructure, as Washington called it, built upon and dependent upon the thirteen state legislatures, without direct connection with the people,"'' 8 it quickly became clear that a national
government, were it to be created, would have to rest upon the
populace." 9 Such recognition of the Constitution's basis in popular sovereignty, together with the popular election of the national
legislature, worked a profound departure from the Article's dependence upon state legislatures, and returned the nation to the
popular sovereignty theory articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Accordingly, the Articles of Confederation may be
viewed as a straying from the mainstream of American constitutional thought, and the Constitution may be seen as a return to
it.190
Indeed, the importance of popular sovereignty is particularly
acute in connection with the trend away from the federal courts'
duty to decide, because not infrequently that trend is excused by
187. W. ANDERSON, THE NATION AND THE STATES, RIVALS OR PARTNERS? 56 (1955).
188. Id. at 62.
189. Anderson identifies four provisions reflecting the popular basis of the Constitution as follows:
The preamble declared that "We, the People of the United States . . . do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." The
word "for" seems to suggest a united people standing above the United States
and making a contribution for them.
One house of Congress was to be apportioned among the states according
to the numbers of their people . ...
Congress was to have power to make laws directly for and applicable to the
people . . . without the intervention of the states.
The Constitution was to be submitted to special conventions of the people
in the several states, not to state legislatures, and was to go into effect when
approved by these popular conventions in nine states, not in all thirteen as was
required for the amendment of the articles.
Id. at 62-63.
190. Id. at 63-64.
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9
references to "a proper respect for states' rights."' ' Such invocation of "states' rights" is a reflection of an erroneous conception
of the states as sovereign. As such, it is patently make-weight: "In
this conception it is the rights of the state per se that are considered; there is no accommodation for the original view of federalism as a device of indirect limitation operating for the benefit of
the individual."' 9 2 After all, how can political entities have
"rights"? People have rights. States have duties, responsibilities,
obligations, even powers and interests-but "rights"?
William Anderson's writings once again clear up such muddled thinking by showing what happened to the rights of states
per se:
One of the most notable clauses in the Articles of Confederation reads: "Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence" . . . .
This seems to imply that the states were separately sovereign and independent before the Articles were adopted, that by
their act of confederating they delegated to Congress whatever
powers it was to have, and that all powers not expressly so
delegated, plus the essence of sovereignty and independence,
were retained by the states. This clearly put or left the states in
the driver's seat.
The framers of the Constitution left out the word
"sovereignty" entirely. It does not appear at all, to describe
either the nation or the states. Since other words from the Articles were included in the Constitution, the presumption must be
that the framers purposely and deliberately omitted the idea
that the states were sovereign.

191. Note, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 75, 98 (1976), supra note 31.
192. Strong-Court vs. Constitution,supra note 182, at 136. See also Wechsler, supra
note 31, at 877:
As the dissenting member of the three-judge district court panel in
Dombrowski, Judge Wisdom delivered a statement on federalism which has yet
to be surpassed:
But
"States' Rights" are mystical, emotion-laden words ....
the crowning glory of American federalism is not States' Rights. It is
the protection the United States Constitution gives to the private
citizen against all wrongful governmental invasion of fundamental
rights and freedoms.
When the wrongful invasion comes from the State, and especially
when the unlawful state action is locally popular or when there is local
disapproval of the requirements of federal law, federal courts must
expect to bear the primary responsibility for protecting the individual.
This responsibility is not new. It did not start with the School Segregation Cases. It is close to the heart of the American Federal Union. It
is implicit in the replacement of the Articles of Confederation by the
Constitution. It makes federalism workable.
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[Article VI] illustrate[s] the completeness of the overturn
in authority that took place when the Constitution replaced the
Articles of Confederation. The former residual "sovereignty" of
the states was eliminated, and in place of it the people of the
United States established the Supremacy of the United States
Constitution and of the proper laws and treaties of the United
States government." 3
This incessant reminder of the importance of popular sovereignty as more than merely a rebuttal of "states rights" rubric
combines with the recognition of the vital "kinship" of and purposive linkage between federalism and separation of powers-components of a dual constitutional scheme for protecting
individual liberties, encouraging rather than deterring federalstate tensions and friction-to pave the way for more detailed
considerations of the respective applications of federalism and
separated powers to the trend toward federal courts' refusals to
decide cases.
A.

Federalism

The three themes which will continue to hover above Part III
should prompt skepticism concerning the propriety of such doorclosing doctrines as abstention. To use federalism as a basis for
such doctrines "involve[s] a tragic abdication by the federal
courts of their responsibilities to protect individuals from unconstitutional state action."'94 Indeed, continuation or expansion of
this tragic trend "would emasculate an important congressional
grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal courts."' 95 This presentation accordingly seeks to establish that "Our Federalism," rather
than evoking a "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments" which in turn requires abstention, 9"' 6 in fact counsels against such refusals to decide cases by
the federal courts.
The development of federalism concepts has been chronicled
so well'97 that only those aspects of that evolution relevant to the
duty to decide need to be discussed here. The analysis will focus
193. Anderson, supra note 187, at 71-72, 75 (emphasis added).
194. Zeigler, supra note 31, at 268.
195. Bartels, supra note 31, at 30.
196. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44.
197. See generally Anderson, supra note 187; Diamond, supra note 67; Diamond, The
Federalist'sView of Federalism, in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 21 (1961); Elazar, Federalism, 5
INT'L ENCYC. SOC. Sci. 353 (1968); S. MOGI, THE PROBLEM OF FEDERALISM (1931); Roche,
Distributionof Powers, 3 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 300 (1968).

44

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 1: 1

on three successive stages in the development of American federalism to demonstrate that at no stage has the doctrine compelled
refusals to decide questions of constitutional liberties: the development during the Constitutional Convention and at the time of
the Constitution's ratification, centering on the victory of federal
(national) supremacy; the development at the time of and since
the adoption of the eleventh amendment until the Reconstruction
period; and the development since the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment.
America's pre-eleventh amendment experience with federalism is detailed carefully in the magnificent writings of Professor
Martin Diamond. The following discussion, providing background essential to any study of the subject, draws heavily from
his work. As Professor Diamond explains, today the forms of government are commonly identified as confederal, federal, and national or unitary, with confederations and nations defining the
extremes. In confederations the associated states retain all sovereign power, and the central body depends entirely on their will;
in nations the central entity is sovereign, and the local units
depend entirely on its will. Federal systems, exemplified by the
United States, fall between the two extremes by modifying and
combining the characteristics of the two other forms.9 8
Yet despite this standard delineation, Professor Diamond
laboriously explains that the Framers, and their contemporary
exposition found in The Federalist, did not conceptualize the
forms of government as we do today. To them, the three-fold
distinction was unknown; for them, only two possible modes existed: confederal or federal, on the one hand, and unitary or national, on the other. "In short, they had a very different under198. Diamond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, supra note 197, at 22. Professor
Diamond, consistent with the writings upon which he expounds, occasionally refers to
sovereignty in America as being found in both the national and state governments. See,
e.g., id. at 22, 25, 48. To the extent that these references are inconsistent with this article's
stressing of exclusive popular sovereignty, see notes 186-93 and accompanying text supra,
the authors express their disagreement with any aspect of any view finding any scintilla
of sovereignty outside of the People. However, the inconsistency probably is more apparent than real. It is true that the Framers at times referred to American governments as
"sovereign," but given their deliberate omission of that concept with reference to governmental bodies in the Constitution together with their strong assertions of popular sovereignty, see text accompanying note 193 supra, it seems more reasonable to conclude that,
whenever they did refer to states or the national government as "sovereign," the Framers
simply meant to use that term as a label for those powers, commonly associated with
sovereignty, which the sovereign People had delegated to those governments. See text
accompanying note 211 infra. After all, these were young revolutionaries seeking and
sometimes misusing old words to describe new ideas-ideas never before found in political
thought! See note 186 supra.
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standing than we do of . . .federalism .

.

. .,"I"
Accordingly,

The Federalist"emphatically does not regard the Constitution as
establishing a typically federal, perhaps not even a primarily federal system of government. '

20 0

Rather, The Federalisttreats the

new government as significantly departing from a truly federal
mode by combining federal with national features. In essence,
what today is deemed a unique and separate principle was in The
Federalistregarded as simply a compound. 20 '

The significance of this analysis should affect our present
interpretations of that revered document. Professor Diamond in
fact refines his analysis further, and in so doing points in the
proper direction:
How The Federalist speaks of federalism must be understood in the light of its task and its audience. It sought to influence the ratification of the Constitution. It chose to do so by
means of a careful commentary on the Constitution which
would emphasize the error or irrelevance of the criticisms being
made against it. Foremost among those criticisms was the
charge that the Constitution had departed grievously from the
true federal form, indeed was "calculated ultimately to make
the states one consolidated government." The author of that
phrase has come to be identified as one of the leading antifederalists. But it must be remembered that in the article
quoted from he signed himself "Letters of a Federal Farmer."
The men we have come to call the anti-federalists regarded
themselves as the true federalists. And we must remember that
the choice of The Federalist as the title of the essays was regarded by many as a shrewd and unwarranted usurpation of
that term. As the issue was fought in 1787-89, The Federalist
(and the Constitution it defended) was attacked as covertly consolidationist [sic], while the opponents of the Constitution
fought as the true defenders of the federal principle. Everything
that The Federalistsays about the federal aspects of the Constitution must be understood, therefore, in the light of its great
necessity: the demonstration that the Constitution should not
be rejected on the grounds of inadequate regard for the federal
principle.
. . .Indeed it could be argued that the modem understanding of federalism results largely from the effort of The Federalist
to allay the fears of the "true federalists." However well The
199. Diamond, The Federalist'sView of Federalism, supra note 197, at 23.
200. Id. at 22.
201. Id. at 22-23.
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Federalistsucceeded with its contemporaries, it succeeded surpassingly with modern political science. 02
It should be clear by now that the authors of The Federalistwere
seeking to support their contraction of the states' roles, rather
than preserve the niceties of what then was called federalism.
Indeed, in several carefully documented passages, Professor Diamond explains the arguments used by Alexander Hamilton to
address Montesquieu's oft-intoned view that republics must be
small, a view used to support the position of those who would
retain the states as the loci of power. Hamilton argued that the
orbit within which popular systems may revolve could be enlarged safely, so long as the basic attributes of confederalism are
preserved:
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States ....
The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be, 'an
assemblage of societies,' or an association of two or more states
into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the
federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the
separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long
as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes;
though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an
association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, . . . fully corresponds, in every rational import of the

terms, with the idea of a federal government.0 3

Professor Diamond's commentary on this excerpt from
Federalist9 notes that those who employed the distinction which
Hamilton attacked, and who insisted that a confederacy must
possess those features which Hamilton denied were essential,
simply were employing the then common understanding of federalism. That view is supported by reference to the dictionaries
employed by Hamilton and Madison as well as their audience:
Dr. Johnson makes clear that the then common understanding
of federalism involved no distinctionbetween confederationand
federalism. The Federalistsimilarly makes no such distinction.
This is evident in the long passage from Hamilton and is true
of the entire work; federal and confederal are used as completely
interchangeable terms. The Federalistagrees fully with the then
common usage at least in seeing but one kind of federal mode. 0 4
202. Id. at 23-24.
203. Id. at 24-25.
204. Id. at 26.
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This historical background, together with the earlier quoted
expositions of William Anderson,205 elucidate several points relevant to the Court's misuse of "Our Federalism" to compel refusals to decide. The anti-federalists were the true federalists; the
Federalists actually were anti-federalists in the sense that they
sought to depart from federalism, then the equivalent of confederalism, by introducing strongly national features into the Constitution. These nationalists even used the title of The Federalistas
a calculated misnomer to mask the degree to which they sought
to deviate from the truly federalistic scheme of the Articles of
Confederation.
The writings of Anderson and especially Diamond continue
by describing in painstaking detail the eventual victory of the
Federalists (nationalists). The very political, agrarian, and monetary injustices which had demonstrated the weaknesses of the
Articles of Confederation, which had prompted the calling of the
Constitutional Convention, and which had even led to Shays'
armed rebellion 20 also had provided the nationalists with their
most effective weapon. Pointing to these injustices, the nationalists overcame Montesquieu's view that republics must be small,
and having rebutted that view, they then were able to argue
effectively that a strong national government was necessary "for
the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Jus2 7
tice': 1
Tyranny is hard for the people to resist in a small state, easier
to resist in a larger state.
. . .Power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have
the same disposition towards the general government. The
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument
of redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the
union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can
never be too highly prized! 200
Consideration of this passage is particularly appropriate with
regard to the trend away from the federal courts' duty to decide.
205. See text accompanying notes 187-89, 193 supra.
206. See Anderson, supra note 187, at 59-61.
207. See note 67 supra.
208. Diamond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, supra note 197, at 53, quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (A. Hamilton).
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For when the states exceed their bounds, the People cannot throw
themselves onto the national side of the scale to use the federal
government as an instrument of redress if the federal courts refuse to be so used. In this light, doctrines such as abstention,
rather than being required by "Our Federalism," instead violate
the very purpose of that protection as envisioned by the Framers!
As further evidence of just how strong a national government
was intended, Professor Diamond describes how Alexander Hamilton and James Madison contemplated that, given the advantages which would flow from the central government, popular
loyalty would turn from the states to it.201 And as if all of the
foregoing were not enough, the Framers built one final articulation of the nationalists' victory into the express language of the
Constitution-the supremacy clause! 210 Nothing in the Constitution or its history better manifests that victory than the concept
of national supremacy.2"' To paraphrase Professor Diamond, so
209. Id. at 46-51.
210. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
211. Anderson, supra note 187, at 769:
To maintain the supremacy of the national government over the states in any
conflict of authority, the original framers took these steps:
They included in the Constitution the "supreme law of the land" clause
already quoted, which made the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States binding on the judges in all states.
They required all state officers and judges to take an oath to support the
United States Constitution, including the supremacy clause.
They provided for a national guarantee of a republican form of government
in each state, which implies the right of the national government to intervene
in state governments.
And they permitted Congress to override state laws for the election of members of Congress.
In addition, judicial review of state legislative acts in the federal courts was
evidently expected to help keep the states in line, while the provisions against
the states' engaging in war, or making treaties or compacts without the consent
of Congress, and other similar restrictions, were clearly designed to keep the
states within a range of primarily internal functions.
In addition to the provisions of the Constitution, there are evidences of a
general intention to subordinate the states to the national government in Washington's letter transmitting the Constitution to Congress, in the writings of the
friends and framers of the Constitution, and in the angry protests of the AntiFederalists who saw what was coming.
There is a little confusion in the evidence, because even Hamilton and
Madison spoke of the "sovereignty" of the states at the same time that they were
stressing state subordination (see The Federalist,no. 31). Apparently they used
the term "sovereignty" rather loosely, sometimes to refer to the position of the
states under the Articles, and sometimes to mean no more than their autonomy
or right to initiate and carry on their own governmental functions under the
Constitution.
See also text accompanying note 193 supra.
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far had the "true" federalists, those originally opposed to the new
Constitution, been driven that they agreed to a central government and agreed to its supremacy.",
The relevance of the battle between the "true" federalists
and the nationalist Federalists, a battle which culminated in the
latter's victory as embodied in the supremacy clause, has not
gone unnoticed by opponents to the trend away from the duty to
decide. Justice Brennan, in the habeas corpus context of his dissent in Stone v. Powell,2t 3 notes:
Congress has the power to distribute among the courts of the
States and of the United States jurisdiction to determine federal
claims ....
* * ' Insofar as this jurisdiction enables federal courts to
entertain claims that State Supreme Courts have denied rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is not a case
of a lower court sitting in judgment on a higher court. It is
merely one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution whereby federal law is higher than State law.214
Indeed, not a scrap of evidence in pre-eleventh amendment
history supports the mindless deference to the states exhibited by
the federal courts' unfortunate door-closing decisions. Far from
requiring such deference, our federalism-the People's Federalism-mandates that the federal courts exercise their jurisdiction
and fulfill their duty to decide. In no other way, to use once again
Hamilton's metaphor,1 5 can the People throw themselves onto
the scale to outbalance state usurpations of their rights, for when
the federal courts jump off the scales, the People cannot even
climb aboard. In no other way can meaning be attributed to the
supremacy clause.
Having fared terribly with respect to the first stage of American federalism's development, perhaps the door-closers can rely
more profitably on the subsequent adoption of the eleventh
amendment. It certainly cannot be gainsaid that this bulwark of
"states' rights," hastily drafted to reverse the Supreme
Court's
decision in Chisolm v. Georgia,'ethrows a wrench into the federalistic works. Chisolm had held that the federal courts had jurisdiction over a suit by the executor of a South Carolina citizen
212. Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism, supra note 67, at 40.
213. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
214. Id. at 527-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
508-10 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (emphasis supplied by Justice Brennan).
215. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
216. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)..
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against the State of Georgia for war debts incurred by the state
in 1777.217 The youthful states reacted quickly to protect their
shaky treasuries from foreign creditors audacious enough to seek
payment of state debts, and the eleventh amendment resulted.,"
Stewart Baker's recent article concerning the amendment
and its relation to federalism 219 depicts a portion of the Constitution whose history, interpretation, and application are so rife with
uncertainty, ambiguity, and double talk that he hypothesizes its
function to be simply to force courts to "balance federal and state
interests in an appropriate fashion. 2 0 His fine work will not be
reproduced here; it is an accurate and painstaking treatment of
an admittedly-muddled subject. However, where prescription
diverges from scholarly description, Mr. Baker openly advocates
an explicit balancing approach. With this approach the authors
take issue.
Superficially, the authors of course disagree with Mr. Baker's
brief, though not critical, references to abstention, particularly
Younger nonintervention, as reflective of the courts' not inappropriate balancing of state and federal interests. 22' More fundamentally, however, they disagree with Mr. Baker's conception of sovereignty in America, a concept permeating his article. On the one
hand, he quite accurately states, in the context of his perceptive
criticism of the use of the sovereign immunity doctrine to help
interpret the eleventh amendment, that "[c]ertainly the transplanted [sovereign immunity] theory made little sense in a democracy where the people are sovereign. ' 22 But with that glancing nod to the fundamental pretext of American constitutionalism,22 3 Mr. Baker proceeds, on the other hand, to refer constantly to the states as sovereign and to treat them analytically
as such. For example, he distinguishes South Dakota v. North
217. See Baker, supra note 148, at 141-42.
218. See generally id. at 142-43. The amendment reads: "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Note that by its literal terms,
the amendment does not preclude a suit by a citizen of State X against State X; nevertheless, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court held that the amendment
did bar such suits. That decision, rendered well after the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, will be discussed infra.
219. See Baker, supra note 148.
220. Id. at 140.
221. See id. at 174.
222. Id. at 154.
223. See notes 186-93 and accompanying text supra.
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Carolina14 from Hans v. Louisiana"'by relying on a specious and
inconsistent conceptualization of sovereignty. In the latter case
the Court held that the eleventh amendment precluded a suit by
a citizen against his own state without the state's consent,
whereas fourteen years later the Court held in South Dakota that
the amendment did not prevent a suit by one state against another. Given all the various reasons for the differing results, ironically Mr. Baker chose to differentiate between the two decisions
on the basis of sovereignty: "the result was different when the
problem of competing sovereignties was raised"2"' in South
Dakota. In other words, to him the suit between two states involved two battling sovereigns, while Hans involved a contest
between a mere citizen and his sovereign state: a distorted perception-especially in view of his earlier recognition of popular
sovereignty. Would it not have been more consistent-and more
accurate-to view South Dakota as a dispute between two governmental servants and Hans as a disagreement between one
governmental servant and one of the sovereign People? 27
Recognition of Mr. Baker's misconception of sovereignty, an
accurate view of which is so crucial to any understanding of federalism, lays the foundation for a critique of his central thesis that
eleventh amendment issues ought to be resolved by resort to an
explicit balancing model. Initially one might ask: if the determinant is a balance between state and federal interests,22 then
where and when do the People's interests come into play? How,
in this scheme, can the People throw themselves onto the scales
as the Framers intended?"2 Mr. Baker's proposal admittedly contemplates the federal judiciary as the governmental body performing the balancing in an independent fashion,3 0 so that refusals to decide are not necessarily dictated by his thesis; moreover,
he further anticipates that the actual balancing 2 1 would involve
placing the "thumb on the scales 2 3 2 such that "when the national
government has a substantial interest in federal jurisdiction over
224. 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
225. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See note 218 supra, and the discussion of Hans infra.
226. Baker, supra note 148, at 159.
227. See generally Abrahams & Snowden, supra note 29, at Part II.A.
228. At least he does not refer to "states' rights." See notes 201-03 and accompanying
text supra.
229. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
230. See Baker, supra note 148, at 180-88.
231. See id. at 175-80.
232. Id. at 177.
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the states, that interest should normally prevail." '33 But how
would this mode of analysis apply in the context of the duty to
decide?
The two-fold answer would seem to mandate federal court
decisions in all cases. These decisions may not always be favorable to the citizen, but nevertheless they would be decisions-not
refusals to decide! For if the citizen is attacking a state statute
as unconstitutional on its face, then surely national interests
(plus the individual's interest) would predominate: the degree of
inconvenience visited upon the state by what usually would be a
summary judgment proceeding" 4 would be minimal when compared to the burdens on the individual and his federal interests
were a decision refused.23 1 On the other hand, if the citizen is
attacking a state statute as it applies to him or her, then still the
national-plus-individual interests would seem to predominate.
True, "as applied" attacks involve more protracted proceedings
than do "facial" attacks, but the results of the former are less
pervasive than the latter. Whereas "facial" attacks can result in
ruling a state statute unconstitutional for all purposes, "as applied" attacks can result in rulings adverse to the states only in
the particular contexts of the suits in which they arise. Neither
stare decisis nor res judicata would prevent the states from preserving their interests in other contexts. Accordingly, once again
the state interests should not be deemed to overpower the federalplus-individual interests. In short, Mr. Baker's balancing approach retains little relevance when the question is whether the
federal courts ought to decide a case.
Additionally, there are historical reasons why the law after
the adoption of the eleventh amendment but prior to the fourteenth does not support the trend away from the duty to decide.
The eleventh amendment, coming as it did after the ratification
of the Constitution, with its inclusion of the supremacy clause
26
and the concomitant victory of the (nationalist) Federalists,
might well have been viewed as a modification of federal supremacy in the context of the duty to decide if the issue had arisen
233. Id. at 180. Actually, one might question whether this system involves balancing
at all! Is it not more in the nature of a general rule (the antithesis of balancing) in favor
of federal court action, with the courts being receptive to the creation of more or less ad
hoc exceptions when the federal interests are less than substantial?
234. "Facial" attacks generally require no great expenditure of time or energy in the
development of a factual record.
235. See notes 51-69 and accompanying text supra. Reread especially the discussion
of "adequacy of legal remedy" and "irreparable injury."
236. See notes 198-212 and accompanying text supra.
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before the fourteenth amendment's adoption. But the issue never
arose during that period. The reasons were historical, as even Mr.
Baker recognizes. 37 Simply stated, during this period the lower
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over those cases which today
typically are subject to the abstention doctrine."" Thus, even
though the concept of nonintervention would have found its most
fertile and receptive ground after the eleventh amendment but
before the fourteenth, the doctrine was never planted then because Congress had fenced off the field.
Indeed, this lack of opportunity stemmed from political
rather than constitutional sources. The Federalists, those nationalists who had won so soundly during the constitutional debates,239 had succeeded in structuring the government, but soon
lost the political power to implement it, as Professor Wechsler
further explicates:
Until 1875 Congress had been very reluctant to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts over cases "arising under" the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. When the Federalists lost the 1800 presidential election to Jefferson, they attempted to mitigate their defeat by packing the federal judiciary while simultaneously extending its jurisdiction. This they
did by enacting the Midnight Judges Act of 1801 . .
Court packing, of course, led to Marbury v. Madison .

.

. The
. In

. .

granting federal question jurisdiction to the federal judiciary in
§ 11 of the Act . . . Congress lifted the statutory language
237. Cf. Baker, supra note 148, at 152: "The question presented most directly by the
text of the [eleventh] amendment is whether a state can be sued in federal court by its
own citizens. The answer was long in coming, perhaps because the issue seldom arose
before federal question jurisdiction was granted to the lower federal courts."
238. Wechsler, supra note 31, at 744-45:
It is . . . surprising that it took almost a hundred years after the first Congress
created the inferior federal courts for the Supreme Court to consider the wisdom
of permitting federal courts to enjoin state criminal prosecutions. The most
plausible explanation for this delay is that lower federal courts were without
jurisdiction in such cases. A person threatened with prosecution by state officials was most likely a citizen of the same state as the local law enforcement
officers. Thus, diversity jurisdiction did not exist. Moreover, there was no federal question jurisdiction because Congress did not choose to grant it to the
federal courts until 1875. This is probably why, in the first three-quarters of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court did not question the propriety of federal
trial court invalidation of state criminal law. The short answer is that the restrictive federal court jurisdiction in that era provided little opportunity for such
action.
(Footnotes deleted.)
239. See notes 198-212 and accompanying text supra.
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squarely from Article III of the Constitution. The Act was shortlived; the Jeffersonians repealed it the following year."'
Accordingly, just as there was no evidence to buttress the
trend away from the duty to decide in the pre-eleventh amendment era, so too is there scant support for refusals to decide
during the period after the eleventh amendment but before the
fourteenth. The eleventh amendment's confused history, leading
perhaps to a balancing analogue prior to the fourteenth's advent,
does not support the trend, nor does the political history, demonstrating as it does the absence of any opportunity for the development of abstention-like notions. In fact, just as pre-eleventh
amendment history instead led to a recognition of the duty to
decide, so also does the duty find strong support during the subsequent period. The federal courts, jealous of what jurisdiction they
did possess, were not about to give it away by refusing to decide
cases. Witness Chief Justice John Marshall's emphatic statement
made in the 1821 case of Cohens v. Virginia:4"
When we consider the situation of the government of the Union
and of a State, in relation to each other; the nature of our constitution; the subordination of the state governments to that constitution; the great purpose for which jurisdiction over all cases
arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, is
confided to the judicial department; are we at liberty to insert
in this general grant, an exception of those cases in which a state
may be a party? Will the spirit of the constitution justify this
attempt to control its words? We think it will not.
Finally, then, having stumbled over pre-fourteenth amendment analysis of federalism, the door-closers arrive at the Reconstruction and later years. Their stumbling becomes a fall, one
candidly offering them some glimmers of hope here and there
prior to their refusals-to-decide pronouncements, but a fall nevertheless. For whatever support they can gather from cases arising
after the fourteenth amendment's adoption is quickly overshadowed by a careful dissection of those cases and a study of other
contemporaneous events. Indeed, that dissection-and-study already has been expressed in Professor Burton Wechsler's compe240. Wechsler, supra note 31, at 745 n.12 (citations omitted).
241. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382-83 (1821). See also the Cohens quote which prefaces
this article. In Cohens the Court held that the eleventh amendment does not bar appeals
to the Supreme Court by state criminal defendants seeking to defend on the basis of
federal law; the state had contended that the appeal constituted a suit "prosecuted"
against it and therefore was barred by the eleventh. See Baker, supra note 148, at 148.
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tent and thoroughly detailed analysis of the precedential basis for
Younger.11 Recall his well-documented thesis that Younger and
its kindred spirits in fact are not supported by the very authorities and (mis)conceptions upon which they rely. 243 Only the high
points need be recounted here.
Initially one must recognize the profound changes worked by
the Reconstruction Congress:
Out of the agony of the Civil War were wrenched the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution, but only after congressional debates which in passion, rhetoric and sheer volume of words dwarfed anything heard in the
halls of Congress before or since. In seven civil rights acts between 1866 and 1875, Congress challenged the nation to undo
the savagery it had visited upon its black population ever since
1619, when the first slave ship set anchor off American shores.
In 1871, Congress created a cause of action against state public
officials who violate constitutional rights and provided the federal courts with jurisdiction to hear such cases. Finally, in 1875,
Congress accomplished what the Federalists, for entirely different reasons, had endeavored to do as early as 1801-to invest
federal trial courts with extensive jurisdiction to hear a sweeping
category of cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the
nation.
The war, the amendments, the Civil Rights Acts and the
vast grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts all had one common historical denominator-a metamorphosis in the relationship between the federal government and the states. A vital
component of that metamorphosis was the enormously increased role of the federal judiciary. In that respect, the years
between 1860 and 1875 constituted the second American revolution-a revolution in federalism.244
Little could be added to this forceful description. Still, rather
than viewing the years from 1860-75 as a "metamorphosis" and

"second American revolution . . . in federalism," allow the au-

thors to suggest that those years instead should be seen as a
return to original principles of federalism. The eleventh amendment had introduced a discordant note of uncertainty in federalstate relations, an uncertainty potentially threatening the hardfought victory of the nationalistic Federalists. The supremacy
clause and its philosophy had been briefly eclipsed by the elev242. See generally Wechsler, supra note 31.
243. See generally id.; text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.

244. Wechsler, supra note 31, at 750-52 (footnotes deleted).
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enth amendment, and the darkness had been deepened by the
political events which deprived the federal courts of federal question jurisdiction.24 ' But now, in the wake of the Civil War, Congress recognized the dire social, political, and indeed constitutional necessity of reasserting the original conception of national
supremacy. In this sense, the fourteenth amendment, so often
viewed narrowly in terms of due process and equal protection, can
be viewed additionally as a structural provision which reestablished the structural protections of "federalism" as they originally had been envisioned by the Framers!
Consider the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and Professor Wechsler's treatment of it: 4'
That Act later became the keystone of constitutional litigation
against state and local public officials . .
to enforce the fourteenth amendment . .

.
.

. [I]ts purpose was
.Referring to state

officials, Representative Perry observed: "Sheriffs, having eyes
to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not;

. . .

grand

and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices." . . . .
Congress did not entrust enforcement of this Act solely to
the state judiciary but simultaneously granted jurisdiction to
federal courts for that purpose.

.

.

.This was the highest acco-

lade. It reflected the ultimate interconnection between the Civil
Rights Act and federal judicial primacy, a relationship skillfully
capsuled by Justice Douglas:
The choice made in the Civil Rights [Act] of

.

.. 1871

. . .to utilize the federal courts to insure the equal rights
of the people was a deliberate one, reflecting a belief that
some state courts, which were charged with original jurisdiction in the normal federal-question case, might not be
hospitable to claims of deprivation of civil rights ....
[T]here has been no alteration of the congressional intent
to make the federal courts the primary protector of the
legal rights secured by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts.
Does this explication of the motivation behind and the importance of the Act not sound reminiscent of the history of the
nationalists' victory at the constitutional and ratification
conventions? Recall James Madison's assertion of the necessity
for a strong national government "for the security of private
rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice." '47 Recall also that
245. See notes 236-40 and accompanying text supra.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see Wechsler supra, note 31, at 852-54 (footnotes deleted).
247. See note 67 supra.
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the supremacy clause-the emblem of the nationalists' victory-was born of political injustices visited upon the citizens of
the new country by the putative states so loosely bound together
by the Articles of Confederation. 4 ' Surely the "metamorphosis"
to which Professor Wechsler refers returned the organism to its
original form.
Given the return to prominence which federal supremacy
enjoyed as a result of the fourteenth amendment, it is somewhat
surprising that the eleventh amendment's shield of the states not
only remained undented for some years, but indeed was at times
2 "9 At a time
strengthened by decisions such as Hans v. Louisiana.
when the nation's Civil War wounds were still relatively fresh, the
Court should have recognized the modifications which the fourteenth amendment had worked; instead, it went beyond the literal wording of the eleventh amendment in Hans to extend its
prohibition to suits brought by a citizen against his or her own
state. That expansion of the terms of the amendment perhaps
would have been defensible prior to the fourteenth amendment,
but given the 1890 date of Hans, the result was absurd. Why
increase the ambit of a provision so clearly modified by a later
amendment? How could a citizen effectively redress unlawful
state action without resort to suit against his or her state?
Clearly "an expansive reading of the eleventh amendment
would debilitate the fourteenth. 2 50 The Court soon was forced to
recognize this and therefore to reassess its view of the eleventh
amendment. Witness Justice Shira's 1903 opinion in Prout v.
2"'
Starr:
It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the immunity of the
individual States from suits by citizens of other States, provided
for in the Eleventh Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which confer power on Congress to
regulate commerce among the several States, which forbid the
States from entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation,
• . .or from engaging in war-all of which provisions existed
before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which still
exist, and which would be nullified and made of no effect, if the
judicial power of the United States could not be invoked to
protect citizens affected by the passage of state laws disregarding these constitutional limitations. Much less can the Eleventh
248.
249.
250.
251.

See notes 206-12 and accompanying text supra.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Wechsler, supra note 31, at 760.
188 U.S. 537 (1903).
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Amendment be successfully pleaded as an invincible barrierto
judicial inquiry whether the salutary provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have been disregarded by state
2 52
enactment.
The final correction came, of course, in the landmark case of
Ex parte Young.253 Both reviled for its sophistry and hailed for its
necessity, the case "probably did more to shape the next generation of constitutional law than [even] Lochner v. New York. "254
Simply stated, the Young Court held that the eleventh amendment does not bar suits against state officials to enjoin the enforcement of unconstitutional state laws, because such officers,
when attempting to effectuate such laws, are stripped of their
character as representatives of the state.2 5 5 Professor Burton
Wechsler eloquently captures the ambivalence thus created by
Young:
The ratio decidendi in Young is hoist by its own petard. For if
an unconstitutional law strips a public official of his garb under
the eleventh amendment, how can the enforcement of such a
law constitute state action under the fourteenth? This paradox
has never been resolved. Nor can it be ....
With all its tortured reasoning, Ex parte Young is one of the
pillars of the American legal system . . . . [I]f Ex Parte Young
had been decided otherwise, freedom itself would have suffered
a terrible blow, for federal courts are the "primary and dominant instruments for vindicating rights given by the Constitution." As Justice Brennan has reminded us:
Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this
Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers
secured elsewhere in the Constitution ....
Professor David Currie agrees:
Behind the outlandish conceptual justification concocted
to support [the] holding [in Young] lay the not implausible conviction that federal constitutional rights could not
be adequately protected without the intervention of federal equity; therefore the philosophy of immunity had to
2 56
yield.
252. Id. at 543 (emphasis added).

253. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
254. Baker, supra note 148, at 157.
255. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra, for a more detailed discussion of
the facts and holding of the case.
256. Wechsler, supra note 31, at 764 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). Professor
Wechsler also states: "Allusions to Ex parte Young are invariably directed to the eleventh
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Perhaps the most succinct statement that can be made about
Young is: given the post-fourteenth amendment absurdity of
Hans, Young was essential for the preservation of the fourteenth
amendment, the supremacy clause, and indeed the Framers' conception of federalism.
So still the history of federalism, now in its post-fourteenth
amendment stage of development, reveals no support for the
door-closers. Unfortunately, however, that did not stop them.
This century began with Young's reaffirmation of the principle
of national supremacy as necessary to popular sovereignty-a
reaffirmation of the duty to decide. But seventy-five years later,
in cases epitomized by Younger and Stone,'57 the Supreme Court
increasingly shirks that duty.258
This trend is all the more shocking in view of the present
Court's apparent recognition that the fourteenth amendment effected a partial repeal of the eleventh. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,2"9
for example, the Court held that "Congress may, in determining
what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts." 6 ' The facts and issue which
provoked this holding were relatively simple. Present and retired
male employees of the State of Connecticut sued for violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging sex discrimination in the state's statutory retirement benefit plan; they requested an award of retroactive monetary benefits in addition to
prospective injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The lower federal
courts allowed the grant of the prospective remedy, but denied
the award of past benefits, holding that such an award would
constitute the recovery of money damages against the state in
contravention of the eleventh amendment. The Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning that the eleventh amendment is "necessarily
limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
2 ' and
Amendment""
that "[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to §
amendment as if this were its sole theme. Discussion of its other motif, state prosecutions
and federal courts, is often mired in a footnote or, more frequently, omitted altogether."
Id. at 765. Hopefully, the authors of the present article do not fit his description; recall
the discussion of Young's treatment of equity issues in Part II supra.
257. See Part II supra.
258. See notes 112-47 and accompanying text supra, for a discussion of precedential
developments after Young but before Younger.
259. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
260. Id. at 456.
261. Id.
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5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary
within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that
authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment
whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on
state authority." '
The Fitzpatrick case, based on such reasoning, was correctly
decided. But just as the spirit of Hans was demonstrably inconsistent with the spirit of Cohens, its predecessor, and Young, its
successor-so, too, is the spirit of Fitzpatrick manifestly inconsistent with the spirit of Younger and its progeny. Fitzpatrick is
not simply a case which balances the fourteenth amendment
against the eleventh, as Stewart Baker perhaps would suggest;263
rather, it is a clear pronouncement that the former modifies the
latter. And yet, as Mr. Baker aptly observes, "the hard question-what laws can be justified as 'enforcement' measures-went unanswered.12 4 This question is particularly important in light of the judicial creation-by-interpretation of constitutional rights, as manifested most vividly in the return to prominence of the "substantive due process" concept. 211 It is one thing
to say, as in Fitzpatrick, that Congress, under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, may create rather specific causes of action against the states which may be vindicated pursuant to the
jurisdictional provisions of sections 1343 or 1331 of the Judicial
Code. But can the federal courts implement judicially-created
rights by resorting to the same jurisdictional provisions and then
pointing to the general authorization of civil rights causes of action in section 1983? Our affirmative answer is supported by twofold reasoning.
First, as Mr. Baker observes, the question is distilled to simple form, rather easily resolved:
Because the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is entirely
within Congress's control, damages cannot be awarded against
a state in the absence of some statute authorizing
them-however vague or general the authorization may be. The
problem, then, is simply put: How clear must the congressional
statement be? . . . . . [Some national interests have become
the preserve of the judiciary. The Federal courts needed only a
broad grant of jurisdiction to create these rights, and the same
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Baker, supra note 148, at 171-72, 187-88.
Id. at 171.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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broad grant should be "clear" enough to permit the federal
courts to enforce them. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer opens another route
to independent judicial restrictions on the states' immunity.
That case held that passage of the fourteenth amendment limited the scope of the eleventh amendment, so that Congress'
enforcement power under section five of the fourteenth amendment was undiminished by the states' immunity from suit in
federal court. But by far the more important aspect of the fourteenth amendment is the content given to it by the judiciary.
In addition to every important provision of the Bill of Rights,
the broad guarantees of "due process" and "equal protection of
the laws" have been held to include a complex grouping of
judge-made doctrines. A broad reading of Fitzpatrickwould permit the federal courts to develop these doctrines free from the
constraints of the eleventh amendment. 2"6
A distinct reason for concluding that section 1983 is broad
enough to grant the needed powers to the federal courts uses
(unnecessarily) the first reason as a springboard. Recall from the
Introduction to this article that several congressmen have taken
the cue provided by Fitzpatrick to introduce legislation which
would, inter alia, make states amenable to suit directly under
section 1983; at the same time, the bill would abolish legislatively
the abstention doctrine in such cases."' As those congressmen
quite clearly view their proposal as a corrective reassertion of the
original conceptions behind the fourteenth amendment as enforced by the Civil Rights Act of 1871,28 surely there should be
no objection to the courts reading section 1983 as presently written to be an authorization broad enough to allow them to enforce
even judicially-created rights as contemplated by the proposed
rearticulation. Perhaps congressional correction of the trend away
6 9 We
from the duty to decide is desirable-but is it necessary?"
think not. We think, rather that the courts themselves are quite
capable of reversing their own unwarranted trend toward refusals
to decide.
Accordingly, as our study of federalism-pre-eleventh
amendment, post-eleventh but pre-fourteenth, and post266. Baker, supra note 148, at 187-88.
267. See notes 1-29 and accompanying text supra.
268. See generally 123 CONG. REC. S201-04 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Mathias).
269. The situation as described here would be somewhat analogous to the arguments
of those who view the equal rights amendment as a measure necessitated only by the
Court's refusal to read the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as embodying the concepts of the ERA. According to these arguments, the amendment is desirable but not really necessary.
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fourteenth amendment style-has demonstrated, there is no
valid support for the Court's use of "Our Federalism" as a basis
for refusing to decide cases brought in federal forums by citizens
seeking to vindicate constitutional liberties infringed by the
states. Indeed, rather than exhibiting support for the doorclosers' trend, a careful analysis of federalism manifests the continued vitality of that doctrine as a structural protection for those
very individual citizens who comprise the popular sovereign. And
that vitality, at every stage of federalism's development, has
counselled not against the federal courts' exercise of their jurisdiction, but instead has dictated the duty of those courts to decide cases brought by one of their sovereign masters-cases in
which the Congress has provided a cause of action as well as
granted jurisdiction.
This invocation of Congress's crucial role in the continued
maintenance of the original and, at least after the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, still-potent conception of federalism
implicates yet another structural argument against the trend
toward refusals to decide. For the invocation reminds us that it
is not only a consideration of federalism's assignment of roles
between the states and national government which mandates reversal of that trend. Rather, there is also the constitutional assignment of responsibilities between the legislative and judicial
branches which must be vindicated. Given Congress's plenary
power to create and destroy jurisdiction in the lower federal
courts, the doctrine of separation of powers, a doctrine providing
yet a second and perhaps more efficacious structural protection
to the People than even federalism, also is at stake. And that
doctrine, with its purpose consonant with that of federalism,7 0
requires a result also consistent with that provided by our analysis of federalism: the federal courts' destruction of their own jurisdiction via refusals to decide violates the principle of fractionalized power; therefore, separation of powers is an additional, and
perhaps more persuasive, reason for reversal of the trend away
from the duty to decide.
B. Separationof Powers
The doctrine of separated, fractionalized powers is so engrained in American constitutionalism that it probably is second
only to popular sovereignty as a fundamental bedrock of our gov270. See notes 179-85 and accompanying text supra.
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ernment. In fact, while the battles raged over federalism at the
Constitutional and state conventions,"' there was near-universal
agreement that separation of powers would be built into the very
structure of the new Constitution.2 Indeed, the only real dispute
over the separation doctrine revolved around whether the inclusion of checks and balances would unacceptably weaken the fractionalization of power which separation dictated.2 3

The ensuing analysis of the bedrock separation doctrine as
it relates to the duty to decide will be, as the reader may notice,
somewhat more truncated than the preceding discussion.
Three reasons counsel this restraint. First, the key principles underlying the doctrine already have been articulated in the opening passages of this Part III. Recall that those principles were (1)
the embodiment of separation of powers in the Constitution as a
structural device for the protection of the citizenry against governmental usurpations of liberty, (2) the inevitable friction
among the departments of government contemplated by the separation doctrine, and (3) the indispensable importance of the
concept of sovereignty of the People to any understanding of separation of powers.
A second reason for a less-lengthy treatment of separation in
the context of the duty to decide is that, although the cases and
literature invariably discuss federalism vis-a-vis abstention, they
almost just as invariably omit consideration of the separation
doctrine as it applies to the problem. Accordingly, there is simply
less material requiring responsive criticism.
Finally, the authors deem it inappropriate to delve as deeply
into the basic philosophy of separation as they did with federalism, as one of them recently co-authored an article containing a
lengthy discussion of the jurisprudential and historical development of the doctrine of fractionalized powersY' Repetition of that
discussion is unnecessary for the purposes of this article.
How, then, does this touted doctrine of separation of powers
bear on the problem of federal courts refusing to decide cases in
which Congress has not only provided a cause of action, but also
271. See Part III.A. supra.
272. See generally Abrahams & Snowden, supra note 29, at Part H.A.
273. See id.
274. See id. The authors here wish to thank Professor John Snowden, the principal
writer of Part H.A. of the Abrahams-Snowden piece, for what they consider to be not only
an exhaustive, but also highly authoritative treatment of the development of separation
of powers. Without his work neither the earlier nor the present article would have been
possible.
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has granted jurisdiction? The answer is two-pronged, the first
prong relying on the spirit25 of the doctrine and the second relying
on its letter.
The spirit of fractionalized powers admittedly is not articulated in the text of the Constitution. But how appropriate it is for
this structural protection to be built into the structural framework of the document. In article I, the People delegated the legislative powers of government to Congress; article II contains their
delegation of executive power to the Presidential branch; article
III, of course, embodies their delegation of judicial power to the
Supreme Court and those lower federal courts which Congress
may create. And yet this explicit delineation of function is violated by the trend toward refusals to decide-indeed, its applicability to that trend is ignored!
That applicability is simply stated. Congress has legislated
both causes of action and jurisdiction in abstention cases; the
courts, without ruling such legislation to be unconstitutional, in
effect have destroyed such jurisdiction by refusing to even decide
those cases; the separation doctrine accordingly is violated not
only by the courts' refusals to perform their judicial duties, but
also by their encroachment into the legislative realm by refashioning the very statutes Congress has enacted. Perhaps this violation is ignored by the cases and literature because it is so basic.
Still, writers more distinguished than the present have recognized
the problems which are implicated.
Dean Frank Strong has carefully distinguished between what
he calls "constitutionaljudicial review" and "ordinary judicial
review. "21 The former is judicial action which involves "court
review of the constitutionality of governmental acts," 2 7 whereas
the latter "consists of judicial reconsideration of legislative and
executive action, as it bears upon a given individual, before gov-

ernmental sanction

. . .

becomes final as to that person.

2

8

The

most familiar aspects of this ordinary form of judicial review,
"which has nothing to do with enforcement of constitutional limi275. Reference to the "spirit" of separation of powers is no mere make-weight. Montesquieu, often considered the founder of the doctrine, see id., in fact entitled his monumental work The Spirit of the Law.
276. See Strong-JudicialReview, supra note 181, at 250-76. See also generally
Strong-Court vs. Constitution, supra note 182; Strong, Three Little Words and What
They Didn't Seem to Mean, 59 A.B.A.J. 29 (1973).
277. Strong-Judicial Review, supra note 181, at 250. See Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
278. Strong-JudicialReview, supra note 181, at 250.
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tations, ' ' 27 9 are statutory interpretation, fact finding, and law
application. 80
Unfortunately, one is hard pressed to determine just which
type of review is being performed by Younger-type cases. Indeed,
the abstention cases hardly are couched in terms of their necessary relationship to statutes, specifically those congressional enactments which create causes of'action and grant jurisdiction.
Rather, they speak in the broad-brushed policy phraseologies of
"equity" and "comity" and "federalism." Reference to federalism, suggesting as it does the interplay between state and federal
governments, might indicate that the refusal-to-decide cases are
performing constitutional judicial review. If so, then they are performing that type of review erroneously, because analysis of the
federalistic bases for the decisions renders, as we have seen, results totally at odds with their outcomes. In short, as a matter of
constitutional decision-making, the cases are wrong in their reliance on federalism to close the courthouse doors.
On the other hand, the abstention cases may not involve
what the Court perceives to be decisions of a constitutional magnitude at all. After all, the Court has never treated the question
as one bearing on the constitutionality of legislative enactments
such as section 1343 of the Judicial Code or section 1983, although
possibly the Court views its decisions as narrowing the scope of
those enactments to avoid problems of constitutional significance. Either way, the likely conclusion is that the refusal-todecide cases actually involve not constitutional review, but rather
ordinary judicial review, the interpretation and application of
statutes, a task clearly conceded to the courts under the separation of powers.28 ' And yet if this be the task which the courts are
performing, then once again their behavior is deficient. When
interpreting statutes, the most familiar dogma-though admittedly not the only lesson to be followed-is that courts should
seek to effectuate the legislative purpose. 82 But how far from the
purpose of enactments such as sections 1343 and 1983 has the
Court strayed! Those statutes, with their well-documented purpose of opening the federal courts as forums for actions against
state intrusions on liberty, hardly are effectuated by the doorclosers' decisions. Indeed, they increasingly are being emascu279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 250-76.

See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS INTHE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW ch. VII (tent. ed. 1958).
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lated by the practice embodied in those decisions. In fact, the
extent to which the Court has deviated from the purpose of Congress in reformulating the latter's enactments constitutes a gross
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. For, as Professor
Reid Dickerson aptly contends in his recent treatise on statutory
construction, the doctrine of fractionalized powers is one of the
basic "assumptions" which must be followed when interpreting
than
statutes: the courts abuse their designated role when, 2rather
3
1
them.
rewrite
they
construing and applying statutes,
Thus, whether the door-closing courts are performing constitutional or ordinary judicial review, the results of their behavior
are sufficiently erroneous to be not merely "wrong decisions," but
indeed wrong decisions which violate the very spirit of the Constitution's embodiment of separated powers. It is simply not the
province of the courts to refuse to perform their tasks or to substitute their own versions of the legislative functions of Congress in
their stead. But even if alone this spirit-oriented analysis is not
persuasive enough, there is more. For in the context of the subject
of federal court jurisdiction, there is support in the very text of
the Constitution for the position that refusals-to-decide violate
the separation doctrine. In order to comprehend this second, textual argument, one initially must understand what is meant by
a "political question."
This concept is but one of many aspects of the separation of
powers. If a case involves a "political question," it is said to be
non-justiciable, and the courts will not decide the question even
if it involves an actual controversy. 8 4 Professor Bickel has described the political question doctrine as "potentially the widest
' 85 Because
and most radical avenue of escape from adjudication."
the existence of a political question means that the courts will not
decide the case, how can that doctrine be at odds with the practice of abstention? The short answer is that the judicially-created
policy of abstention involves a decision not to decide, but that
very decision of whether or not to decide cases is one to be made
not by the Supreme Court, but rather by Congress pursuant to
its clearly-articulated article I powers to define and control jurisdiction in the lower federal courts. Just as relations with foreign
governments are committed by the Constitution to the political
283. See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
ch. 1 (1975).
284. WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 14, at 52.
285. Bickel, Foreward:The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 45 (1961) (emphasis
added).
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departments, the jurisdictional relationship between the federal
courts and the states is committed by the Constitution to Congress. Just as the question of what constitutes a republican form
of government is a political question, so too are questions involving "Our Federalism" and comity. And even assuming that some
principle of equity forbids the courts from using that power to
intervene between states and the citizenry, Congress nevertheless
has chosen not to limit the federal courts to traditional legal and
equitable remedies.28 A more specific application of these notions
to the duty to decide question is in order.
Younger supposedly was based on principles of equity, comity, and "Our Federalism." Later, when the Younger doctrine
ventured into the field of civil litigation, reliance on equity was
dropped and the Court concentrated on comity and federalism.
Yet those two concepts as used by the Court are just two different
ways of expressing the same notion. Justice Black even equated
the two terms in his opinion in Younger.287 As employed by the
Court, "Our Federalism" is concerned merely with the proper
respect or deference to be paid to state governments.
But questions concerning the amount of respect or deference
to be paid to the states are questions to be answered by Congress,
at least as far as those questions concern the jurisdiction of federal courts. Congress is given the power to provide the answers to
those questions by articles I and III of and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, and it has exercised that power frequently in the past, at times choosing to withdraw the federal
courts' power of intervention, 8 and at other times choosing to
authorize such intervention, even into state court proceedings.2 89
Recall, too, that enactment of the Three-Judge Court Act was a
means chosen by Congress to pay deference to state governments
without withdrawing the power of federal courts to intervene. The
basic course chosen by Congress when it enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 has not been altered by legislation. It should not be
altered by judicial fiat. And the question of whether to alter that
course is political and, therefore, should be made by the proper
political branch of government-Congress.
In Baker v. Carr8 0 the Supreme Court enunciated six tests
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
287. See 401 U.S. at 45.
288. See, e.g., The Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970), and The Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
290. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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for determining when a question is political, and therefore nonjusticiable. They are:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.2'
A question meeting any one of these tests is deemed political and
is not to be decided by the courts.
The question(s) of "Our Federalism," that is, the respect or
deference to be paid to state governments in determining when
the federal courts may intervene in their operation, certainly
meets the first of those tests. It is highly probable that it also
meets the second, and it is at least arguable that it meets some
of the others.
Baker's first test, a "textually demonstrable commitment of
the issue" of the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
Congress, is met beyond question. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[tlo constitute [t]ribunals inferior to the
[Slupreme Court ' 12 and vests the judicial power of the United
States in the Supreme Court "and in such inferior [c]ourts as
'293 It
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
also gives Congress the power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 2 4 and to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of" the fourteenth amendment.2 91 The
"wide power in Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal
courts has never been challenged, '298 and the Supreme Court has
stated time and time again that it is Congress which possesses
"the sole power of creating the tribunals . . . for the exercise of
the judicial power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholdingjurisdiction
291. Id. at 217.
292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
293. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
294. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
295. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
296. WRIGHr, supra note 31, § 11 at 27.
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from them in the exact degrees and characterwhich to Congress
may seem proper for the public good. "217 Yet the trend toward
federal courts' refusals to decide has the effect of "withholding
jurisdiction" from the district courts. It alters their jurisdiction
just as surely as if Congress had legislated the change. It is a
usurpation of power committed to Congress by the Constitution
and on that ground alone is unconstitutional.
Yet there is another reason why questions of comity and
"Our Federalism" are political. The second test from the Baker
case brands them as such. If anyone doubts that there is "a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving those questions, let him read the opinions of the two courts
that decided the litigation in Trainor v. Hernandez.2 1 Of the
twelve federal judges involved in the decision, seven thought abstention was inappropriate and five thought it was appropriate.
The minority prevailed because of higher judicial rank. The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens responded, branding the doctrine of abstention as "increasingly Daedalian." ' l
Finally, although Professor Burton Wechsler did not attack
the Younger doctrine on the ground that it involved a political
question, his article31 gives substance to the argument that at
least the values protected by the first amendment provide "an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made." That political decision is embodied in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act and the legislation giving district
courts jurisdiction to enforce it. Thus, the Younger doctrine also
may fail the fifth test in Baker.
So much for comity and "Our Federalism." Clearly those
concepts, as they are used by the Court in Younger, involve political questions that are to be answered by Congress. But what
about equity? Does it save the Younger doctrine as applied in
criminal cases? We think not. Part II of this article attempted to
show that there never was a "general rule" forbidding equitable
intervention into criminal proceedings. However, even if there
were such a rule it would make no difference, for in making the
political decision to give the federal courts power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment, Congress provided for more than tradi297. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) (emphasis added); see also cases
cited in WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 11 at n.28.
298. 97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977).
299. Id. at 1931. Daedalus was the legendary figure who built the labyrinth in Crete
for King Minos and was then imprisoned in it with his son Icarus.
300. Wechsler, supra note 31.

70

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 1:1

tional legal and equitable remedies. The Civil Rights Act allows
"an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress,"1 and because we know that the Act was intended to
enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment "against
State action, . . . whether that action be executive, legislative or
judicial, ' ' 302 we must assume that Congress contemplated injunctions against state court proceedings.
Under the political question doctrine the federal courts accordingly have a constitutional duty to decide, on the merits,
cases falling within the jurisdiction which Congress has seen fit
to provide for the public good. And because the Constitution
grants Congress the power to determine the scope of the judicial
power, it implicitly creates a duty on the part of Congress to
provide the federal courts with the manpower and wherewithal to
perform their duties. So if both departments, the courts and Congress, perform their respective chores, there should be neither a
desire by the former to whittle away at its own responsibilities,
nor a need for the latter to enact legislation to prevent such
carving-up of the federal judiciary's jurisdiction. If both branches
adhere to their roles as assigned by the sovereign People, then
neither the spirit nor the letter of the separation of powers doctrine will be violated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Having explored the length and breadth of the problem of
federal courts refusing to exercise their jurisdiction in Part UI, the
analysis turned in Part III to a consideration of the constitutional
dimensions of the problem. In the former, the nonconstitutional
aspects of the trend away from the duty to decide were examined
and found insufficient to support that trend; in the latter, the
constitutional concept of federalism was described not as an excuse for the door-closers, but rather as an affirmative reason for
rejection of their position. Finally, Part I closed with arguments
that the refusal-to-decide cases violate both the spirit of separation of powers and its embodiment in the text of articles I and
I of the Constitution. In short, cases like Younger are based on
groundless reasoning, constitute violations of the Constitution,
and should be rejected-if not by judicial reconsideration, then
by legislative correction.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (emphasis added).
302. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972), quoting Ex parteVirginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1879).
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The portrait need not be so bleak, however. Even at a time
when the Supreme Court constantly is expanding the reaches of
the Younger "doctrine," Congress is considering a corrective statute: the Civil Rights Improvements Act. And lower federal courts
hardly are unanimous in their welcome of the Supreme Court's
door-closing pronouncements. Witness the following protest by
one of those lower courts, one apparently comprehending the duty
to decide:
Abstention is a formidable doctrine in the federal forum comprised of medusan components that, absent the most meticulous inspection, will transfix and render powerless both litigants
and jurists. Its application should be grounded upon fixed principles, strictly applied to the facts of the federal litigation, for
an equally formidable doctrine obligates the federal judiciary as
much to exercise jurisdiction properly invoked as to dismiss a
proceeding where jurisdiction is wanting. Abstention must rest
on sound jurisprudential underpinnings; it must not be a label
for a visceral aversion to our article I obligation to adjudi3
cate.10
Given the absence of "sound jurisprudential underpinnings" and
lack of "fixed principles" for its application, the abstention doctrine together with the other manifestations of the trend away
from the duty to decide should be laid to rest.
303. Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F. Supp. 754, 763 (N.D. Tex. 1974), quoted in
Harris, supra note 31, at 16.

